I made a copy paste error.
> A will be eliminated. B wins.
should be
"L will be eliminated. R wins."
Juho
On Nov 17, 2006, at 18:58 , Juho wrote:
> Earlier I mentioned that the Ranked Preferences Method may need some
> fine tuning to avoid situation where votes of some voters may work
> against
Earlier I mentioned that the Ranked Preferences Method may need some
fine tuning to avoid situation where votes of some voters may work
against their interests. Now I found the time to do that.
The Ranked Preferences Method could be characterized by saying that
during the process of eliminat
On Tue, 31 Oct 2006 19:43:13 -0500 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 12:19 AM 10/31/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>>This certainly DOES NOT earn a need for special assistance to such a voter.
>>
>>Whatever information may be available, if the voter does not know enough
>
>>from it to HAVE a pers
At 12:19 AM 10/31/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>This certainly DOES NOT earn a need for special assistance to such a voter.
>
>Whatever information may be available, if the voter does not know enough
>from it to HAVE a personal preference, the obvious response is to not vote
>- leaving to others estab
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:09 AM 10/30/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
The strongest preference is expressed in range by rating the
undesired outcome at the minimum rating and the desired outcome at
the maximum rating. If the majority does this, and i
On Oct 28, 2006, at 20:05 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> I attach more weight to criteria that encourage sincere voting
> Obviously not everybody agrees with me
I certainly do. The Ranked Preferences proposal could be
characterised as a method that tries to climb as high up as possible
in ex
A general comment on this discussion thread.
I think what we would need here is few more well defined concepts to
help us defining what we mean. The first term I'd like to see defined
is a concept that I might call competitiveness. I have seen different
people using different terms when refe
On Oct 28, 2006, at 5:57 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> But I'm trying to balance between different criteria
>> here.
>
> You are trying to balance between a broken criterion and an
> effective one. The result can only be a reduction of effectiveness.
>
> (Technically, the Majority Criterion is
At 06:09 AM 10/30/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
>Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>The strongest preference is expressed in range by rating the
>undesired outcome at the minimum rating and the desired outcome at
>the maximum rating. If the majority does this, and if they are in
>agreement about these two
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>
>
>
The problem with Range is that if "the majority" are not self-aware
and coordinated, they cannot
"easily get what they want".
>>> On the contrary, the condition being described was that the majority
>>> had a strong preference. Under Range,
At 09:13 AM 10/29/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
>CB: No.I see "group decision making process" as spread out along a
>continuum with "informal consensus"
>at one end and civil war or violent "mob rule" at the other. Abd
>sees elections as (in his view undesirably)
>substituting for consensus and wants
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:34 PM 10/27/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
That is, healthy group decision process follows certain general
principles. The Majority Criterion neglects an important part of this.
That is beca
At 11:34 PM 10/27/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
>Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>>That is, healthy group decision process follows certain general
>>principles. The Majority Criterion neglects an important part of this.
>>
>That is because it is about *elections*, which of course isn't
>necessarily the
At 10:57 PM -0400 10/27/06, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>This is simply a guess, and is probably a bad one. Insincere voting
>damages the utility of the election *for those who vote insincerely.*
>They risk achieving a poor outcome. Essentially, they are taking an
>intelligent process and attempting
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>That is, healthy group decision process follows certain general
>principles. The Majority Criterion neglects an important part of this.
>
>
That is because it is about *elections*, which of course isn't
necessarily the beginning and end
of "healthy group decisi
At 02:00 AM 10/27/2006, Juho wrote:
>Ok. I agree that B has the best social utility from "Range
>perspective".
I don't think that way. B has the best social utility from my
understanding of how society works. If this is a group of friends
trying to buy pizza, and A and B are pizza flavors, and o
Ok. I agree that B has the best social utility from "Range
perspective". But I'm trying to balance between different criteria
here. One strict rule for me when designing this method was to keep
sincere voting possible and probable. If that would not have been the
goal I could have picked e.
(You sent this personally to me, not to the list.)
I still don't understand it. My time is quite limited, so if I can't
get it by reading it over, I don't have time to figure out what each
clause might possibly mean. That's the kind of analysis it would
take. I assume that you *do* mean somethi
At 04:38 PM 10/26/2006, Juho wrote:
>This makes voting one step easier than with the 0-99 style Range
>votes.
Range should be considered as a general method where votes are values
which will be summed. Limiting Range to 0-99 Range (Range 100 because
there are 100 discreet values possible as a vo
This makes voting one step easier than with the 0-99 style Range
votes. Some calculations needed still to see/check the relative
strength of the preferences. This proposal brings into my mind
another intermediate variant Ann--Jill-Jack---John where the dashes
"-" represent ones "1" and can
As promised in my previous mail here are some example calculations to
demonstrate how the Ranked Preferences work. Plus some additional
notes at the end.
- I use * to mark numbers that are based on the tied at top/bottom
rules.
- I use "A-B" as a shorthand for "A compared to B"
- I use "[ ]"
At 01:06 PM 10/26/2006, Simmons, Forest wrote:
>How about having the voters rank the candidates with the option of
>skipping numbers: the more numbers skipped the stronger the preference.
If the rank numbers are summed, what this creates is Range Voting
with inverted values. Lowest sum wins. Pre
How about having the voters rank the candidates with the option of skipping
numbers: the more numbers skipped the stronger the preference. Thus
1 Ann, 3 Jill, 4 Jack, 7 John
would translate to
Ann>>Jill>Jack>>>John
Forest
Juho wrote ...
Ranked preferences could be derived from range
Ranked preferences could be derived from range. A=99, B=60, C=50,
D=11 could be read as A>>B>C>>D. The information could be read also
from some "floating point graphical format" (e.g. bars of different
length). In these styles it may not be easy to express preferences of
equal strength (lik
If a method uses the type of information you're referring to, then I
think it is much more convenient to use rating (range style) ballots and
infer it from them.
Chris Benham
Simmons, Forest wrote:
>I think this style of ballot (with relative strengths of preferences
>indicated) are a good
I think this style of ballot (with relative strengths of preferences indicated)
are a good compromise between range ballots and ordinary rankings.
We have just scratched the surface when it comes to their possible applications.
Forest
<>
election-methods mailing list - see http://electoram
Here is also one concrete example of the use of the (described
version of the) method. Maybe this helps in seeing how it works. I
hope I didn't make many mistakes in it.
Juho Laatu
45: L>C>R
20: C>>R>L
35: R>>C>L
In the first 45 votes > is the strongest relation and the top
strength of t
Hello All,
Here is a new voting method for you to check. This method was created
as a result of a study on if Condorcet methods can be made more
expressive without losing their best properties. This method seemed
to me to be a quite natural path forward. I'm not quite sure if the
benefits
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