Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

On Tue, 15 Aug 2006 23:07:47 -0400 Warren Smith wrote: > http://rangevoting.org/CondAppConflict.html > > The Condorcet and Approval winners cannot differ if there is no tie > and if the Approval voters all place their approval thresholds strategically > under the guess it is going to be A vs C whe

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

At 10:07 PM -0400 8/20/06, Dave Ketchum wrote: >Maybe time to start over, unless someone can find something decent >written down! > >We are talking of ranked choice, such as IRV does. Right, or any other ranked method. >Normally possible to rank every candidate. Restrictions tolerable, >but MU

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

> Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 9:08 PM > To: Jonathan Lundell > Cc: election-methods@electorama.com > Subject: Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial > > Maybe time to start over, unless someone can find something decent written > down! > &g

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

Sentences should have subjects and predicates. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Dave Ketchum Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 9:08 PM To: Jonathan Lundell Cc: election-methods@electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no con

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

Maybe time to start over, unless someone can find something decent written down! We are talking of ranked choice, such as IRV does. Normally possible to rank every candidate. Restrictions tolerable, but MUST be able to rank at least best and second. Equal ranks permitted, when the voter sees

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

At 4:58 PM -0700 8/16/06, David Cary wrote: >Without knowing the exact wording of the criterion, it can be very >difficult to judge whether or not an election method meets the >criterion, or whether the criterion makes sense or contains >ambiguities. > >As stated on Wikipedia ( >http://en.wikipedi

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

At 07:58 PM 8/16/2006, David Cary wrote: >"The Condorcet criterion for a voting system is that it chooses the >Condorcet winner when one exists." > >"The Condorcet candidate or Condorcet winner of an election is the >candidate who, when compared in turn with each of the other >candidates, is prefer

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Approval Voting satisfies the Condorcet criterion (as does > Plurality). The idea that it does not is based on the imputation of > unexpressed preferences. That is, *if* there were more expressible > ranks, and the voters used them, the outcom

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

On Wed, 16 Aug 2006 00:44:53 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > Approval Voting satisfies the Condorcet criterion (as does > Plurality). The idea that it does not is based on the imputation of > unexpressed preferences. That is, *if* there were more expressible > ranks, and the voters used them

Re: [EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

Approval Voting satisfies the Condorcet criterion (as does Plurality). The idea that it does not is based on the imputation of unexpressed preferences. That is, *if* there were more expressible ranks, and the voters used them, the outcome could change. (But if the Condorcet criterion *requires*

[EM] simpler proof of "no conflict theorem" now trivial

http://rangevoting.org/CondAppConflict.html The Condorcet and Approval winners cannot differ if there is no tie and if the Approval voters all place their approval thresholds strategically under the guess it is going to be A vs C where A and C are the putative Approval and Condorcet winners. In v