Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

On 8/25/07, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading > > and randomness. > > There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been > studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see

Re: [Election-Methods] [EM] A more efficient strategy-free ratings-based method than Hay voting

Jobst, It was Hay Voting that I was referring to. Maybe this post contains the desired answer to your puzzle? Kevin Venzke --- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Dear Forest, > > you wrote: > > > I have one question, though. If best strategy is to report true > > utilities, then wha

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

At 09:01 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: >Dear Steve, > > > Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to > > make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the > > compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference > > intensity f

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

At 09:09 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: >Dear Abd ul-Rahman! > > >Range *is* a majoritarian method since a majority can elect whomever > > >it wants by bullet voting. > > > > That does not contradict what I wrote. Being a "majoritarian" method > > does not make the method Majority Criterion com

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

At 09:16 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: >I don't think nearly half of the electorate should pay the other >half for getting what is the more just solution in my eyes. Perhaps >that is a difference in culture? No. It's an understanding of what utilities mean. If A does not win, the supporter

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

Dear Kevin, > Hi, > > It seems to me there might be a use for something like the method that > was proposed awhile ago that had to do with offering voters incentives > to give sincere ratings. For example, the majority would give the > sincere score to their compromise in exchange for their vote

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

Dear Forest, > The main thing I overlooked was vote trading. > > So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading > and randomness. There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the comprom ise when there're only 2 factions

Dear Abd ul-Rahman, > Okay, here is my solution. The B voters gain some very substantial > advantage for the election of C over the favorite of the A voters, > who have only a substantially smaller preference for A over C. > > So the B voters offer something of value to the A voters to > compe

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

Dear Abd ul-Rahman! > >Range *is* a majoritarian method since a majority can elect whomever > >it wants by bullet voting. > > That does not contradict what I wrote. Being a "majoritarian" method > does not make the method Majority Criterion compliant. I did not claim that is does. But the rele

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

Dear Steve, > Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to > make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the > compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference > intensity for A over C. Sorry, I had just not read carefully

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the comprom ise when there're only 2 factions

Dear Brian! > But to me the end of the strategy discussion is that the A faction > could simply bullet vote and no system can recover from a simple > majority of votes {A=100,B=0,C=0}. If that was so, I would not have posed the question :-) There are methods that will lead to the election of