Suppose this scenario:
46: A B C
5: B A C
5: B C A
44: C B A
B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters.
A possible patch is to avoid rank-only ballots and ignore candidates with
less than 1/2 approval (or total score, if range ballots are used) of the
most approved
Hi,
Diego Santos wrote:
2007/12/3, Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a
few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote
strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner
could withdraw
Since A C are tied, you cannot do any better than B.
Get far enough away, and A or C will properly win.
I do not like '' for Condorcet.
On Mon, 10 Dec 2007 14:17:53 -0300 Diego Santos wrote:
Suppose this scenario:
46: A B C
5: B A C
5: B C A
44: C B A
B beats A and C, but he
At 04:30 AM 12/9/2007, Jan Kok wrote:
On Dec 7, 2007 7:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The case in Brown v. Smallwood was one where the result
overturned by the court was clearly just, and the reversal -- a long
time after the election -- was very poor public policy.
At 09:29 AM 12/9/2007, Diego Santos wrote:
2007/12/9, Jan Kok mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well, I consider almost any form of Bucklin more palatable than IRV,
and of course it is better than Plurality.
Bucklin is not so bad, but I still think that a better ranked method
should
