Greg doesn't need to twist my arm to get me to agree about spoiling in
Range Voting, depending on the validity of the assumptions one must make
(due to lack of empirical data using RV in high stakes public elections)
about voters' strategizing.
Also, as Greg implicitly pointed out where he wro
Excellent points, Juho. I'll just add a few more.
- You're right, Nader supporters could learn that it's in their best
interest to give Gore a '10'. Under plurality, they could also learn
that it's in their best interest to vote for Gore instead of Nader.
Although they could learn the best strateg
Great comments, Steve. I think you're basically right, though I'll
mildly disagree on a couple things . . .
> However, IRV is worse at eliminating spoilers than some other methods.
> It also undermines candidates who take centrist compromise positions, by
> defeating them and making them appear
I will talk of these in the order listed: Plurality, Approval, Range, IRV,
and Condorcet. Other is simply any other method - which do not get
discussed because I have not heard of them as competitive with those
discussed.
Three candidates:
H(ot) - I WANT this one to win.
C(old) - I
