I see governor as the initial office to attend to. Simpler single person
offices can be simplified from that base.
Presidential race is even more important, but its extra complications
deserve a separate discussion after this one.
I see Condorcet and RV as the base election methods. I will
On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very
flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt. The
rules
also could be much simpler than including all the listed
possibilities.
My intention is just to show
Jobst,After thinking about your recent example: 33: A1AA2 B 33:
A2AA1 B 33: B A1,A2,Aand the 66 A-voters try to cooperate to elect
A by unanimously approving of her, then they still get A only with a low
probability of 16/81 (approx. 20%) while A1 and A2 keep a probability of
64/243
Dear Forest,
a quick calculation for your suggestion (please check!) gives:
Winning probability for A under full cooperation of the A1 and A2 voters:
(16+4*8)/81 + 8/27*1/2*2/3 = 56/81 = approx. 70% (OK)
Gain in expected utility for the A1 voters when reducing their
cooperation by an
Friends,
Would anyone like to co-author or help review a short paper I am going
to publicly release to our 14,000-strong email announcement list on
Ten Reasons to Oppose IRV?
I have a draft ready for review.
I am taking time off from other pressing issues to write it due to the
widespread push
Dear Jobst,
I think you are right: Plain random ballot (as fall back) induces full
cooperation at lower values of alpha than does a mixture of plain and approval
random ballot, since the penalty is greater for failing to cooperate in the
former case.
However, given a value of alpha for
On May 28, 2008, at 1:24 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Tue, 27 May 2008 19:33:29 +0300 Juho wrote:
On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very
flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt.
The rules
also
