Kathy,
Imagine that Approval is used to elect the US President and
as in the current campaign the Republicans are fielding one
candidate, McCain. Does that mean that the big fight for the
Democrat nomination between Clinton and Obama we've just
seen would in the Approval scenario be complete
Kathy,
Imagine that Approval is used to elect the US President and
as in the current campaign the Republicans are fielding one
candidate, McCain. Does that mean that the big fight for the
Democrat nomination between Clinton and Obama we've just
seen would in the Approval scenario be complete
At 01:17 PM 6/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kathy Dopp > Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2008 4:53 AM
> I try not to waste time
> on stupid ideas and I've already wasted over 6 weeks of this
> year considering IRV which is an incredibly stupid voting
> method at first glance after 15 minutes of study IMO.
Hi, Kristofer, your idea seems interesting, but I couldn't understand some
points:
- When you presents simulation results, is the best method the one with
greatest or smallest score? IRV is considered the best majoritarian method
but its score is between Nauru-Borda and Plurality
- In some countr
On Sun, Jun 22, 2008 at 5:00 PM,
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
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Tells us little since this is one person's opinion.
IRV lets voters state their desires more completely than Plurality and is
often better at picking a winner - but sometimes fails badly, so:
Not too bad when you do not know of better.
I join Kathy in wantng to move to better.
DWK
On Sun, 22
A brief reaction to some of Abd's commentary on my simple example of how
Range can suffer from spoiler dynamics...
Abd wrote
A new candidate, C, is considered "fantastic" by 25/55 of the A
supporters. So they switch their votes. As would be expected, surely,
from such an introduction, results can
On Jun 22, 2008, at 22:33 , Kathy Dopp wrote:
In fact, I would oppose any voting method which did "not" violate
Chris' new condition that even when voters change their votes, the
winner should stay the same.
Although Chris' voters changed their vote they didn't change their
opinions between
On Jun 21, 2008, at 1:09 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Hello all,
(says the newcomer.)
Welcome.
First, set that there are n binary issues. Each of the voters then
have an issue profile which consists of n booleans.
How do see the role of parties here? Do you use e.g. a binary
decisio
Yes, this was an excellent (clear basic) example as well. The
introduction of new candidates definitely changes the scoring of the
candidates by the voters.
One can study also voter specific absolute scoring that never changes
despite of changes in the candidate list. This is a theoretical
Chris,
This is what you are now claiming is a "fairness" condition:
... that to be fair, the winner of an election must not change with
the introduction of a new nonwinning candidate, even if the voters
change their votes for the prior (old) candidates.
As a voter, I would object to this "fairne
Abd,
"When you assume a set of ratings which are clearly normalized,
they are no longer independent and absolute, and conclusions drawn
from them, based on the introduction of a new candidate or a
candidate withdrawal, are no longer valid. By using normalized
utilities, and assuming that they
At 12:35 PM 6/22/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Ms. Dopp has requested a clearer example of how Range and Approval voting
can experience a spoiler scenario (through violation of the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Criterion). Although her inability to
follow Chris's logic led her to u
Kathy Dopp > Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2008 4:53 AM
> I try not to waste time
> on stupid ideas and I've already wasted over 6 weeks of this
> year considering IRV which is an incredibly stupid voting
> method at first glance after 15 minutes of study IMO.
So what does this tell us about the many
At 03:58 AM 6/22/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Kathy,
I choose my words carefully.
"You managed to invent a really bad voting method (asking voters for
ratings and then converting their ratings to approval/disapproval by
your new voting method) and applied your method of conversions to your
own exa
Ms. Dopp has requested a clearer example of how Range and Approval voting
can experience a spoiler scenario (through violation of the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Criterion). Although her inability to
follow Chris's logic led her to use extremely disrespectful language, I
will
On Sun, Jun 22, 2008 at 1:58 AM, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Apart from a passing reference to Range the only voting method I discussed
> or referred to was Approval.
OK Chris,
Let us look at your alleged two examples of "approval" voting. LOOK at
what you gave us:
65 A
35 B
th
On Jun 22, 2008, at 6:52 , Kathy Dopp wrote:
5. Change the rules (or is the rule for your new voting method always
"approve a number of top candidates equal to the total number of
candidates minus one" for each voter?) and this time drop all except
the top two choices of voters and give the rema
Kathy,
I choose my words carefully.
"You managed to invent a really bad voting method (asking voters for
ratings and then converting their ratings to approval/disapproval by
your new voting method) and applied your method of conversions to your
own example, but it has nothing to do with either r
Kathy,
I choose my words carefully.
"You managed to invent a really bad voting method (asking voters for
ratings and then converting their ratings to approval/disapproval by
your new voting method) and applied your method of conversions to your
own example, but it has nothing to do with either r
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