Re: [Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV?

2008-07-07 Thread Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (Sun Jul 6 16:36:32 PDT 2008 ): There is a lot of momentum behind IRV.  If we cannot stop it, are there some tweaks that would make it more liveable? Someone has suggested that a candidate withdrawal option would go a long way towards ameliorating the damage. Here's another

Re: [Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV?

2008-07-07 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Mon, 7 Jul 2008 17:31:34 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote: Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2008 23:36:32 + (GMT) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] There is a lot of momentum behind IRV. If we cannot stop it, are there some tweaks that would make it more liveable? Hi Forest. I think we can stop that madness. I belie

[Election-Methods] Re : A Better Version of IRV?

2008-07-07 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Forest, --- En date de : Dim 6.7.08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > There is a lot of momentum behind IRV. If we cannot stop > it, are there some tweaks that would make it more liveable? My idea is to cripple it: 1. The voter ranks a first preference and a second preferenc

Re: [Election-Methods] USING Condorcet

2008-07-07 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Juho, --- En date de : Lun 7.7.08, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > Hi Juho, > > > > --- En date de : Jeu 3.7.08, Juho > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > >> That scenario was the simplest I could imagine. > Only three > >> candidates. One strong candidate but below > majority, one > >> wea

Re: [Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV?

2008-07-07 Thread Kathy Dopp
> Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2008 23:36:32 + (GMT) > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV? > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > There is a lot of momentum behind IRV. If

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge Problem

2008-07-07 Thread fsimmons
Jobst, What about this method that doesn't even draw a ballot unless it first eliminates the approval winner? 1. Let x be the percentage of the ballots approving the approval winner X. 2. Elect X with probability g(x), else elect the favorite of a randomly drawn ballot. This method la

Re: [Election-Methods] Fun with Friends and Dice

2008-07-07 Thread fsimmons
Dear Jobst, After submitting it I realized that my most recent proposal (repeated below) is not monotone. If I am not mistaken, a change in the definition of "friend" would fix it, but then the word "ally" would be more appropriate. New Definition: Two ballots (that indicate both favorite a

Re: [Election-Methods] Matrix voting and cloneproof MMP questions

2008-07-07 Thread Juho
Few notes. In some cases having an opposition may be a positive thing. E.g. having always the same government may not be a good thing in the long run. One approach is to use some single winner method to determine the preferred coalition that should form the government (I'm assuming a mu

Re: [Election-Methods] USING Condorcet

2008-07-07 Thread Juho
On Jul 6, 2008, at 5:48 , Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Juho, --- En date de : Jeu 3.7.08, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : That scenario was the simplest I could imagine. Only three candidates. One strong candidate but below majority, one weaker runner-up, and third clearly weaker candidate. This