I don't see how IRV's failure to elect the Condorcet candidate is
necessarily linked to its "non-monotonicity".
There are monotonic (meets mono-raise) methods that fail Condorcet, and
some Condorcet methods that fail mono-raise.
(For information: I think Bucklin would be an example of the forme
Dear Forest,
I'm sorry again for answering so late - I always find time to read your
messages and even think some time about them but not for answering...
What occupies me most at this moment with your idea of using some
"degree of cooperation" to determine the weights in a mix of a random
b
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
"The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's
specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm
At 07:26 PM 7/12/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
By raising one-sided objections to
any particular reform proposal that is being seriously considered, the net
effect is most likely to be to shore up the status quo, rather than to
advance one's favored method. If election method experts put their uni
On Sun, 13 Jul 2008 23:37:28 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
"The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's
spec
