> I think Smith (or Shwartz),IRV is quite a good Condorcet method. It
> completely fixes the failure of Condorcet while being more complicated
> (to explain and at least sometimes to count) than plain IRV, and a Mutual
> Dominant Third candidate can't be successfully buried.
> But it fails Later
On Wed, 16 Jul 2008 18:31:04 - Bruce R. Gilson wrote:
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tue, 15 Jul 2008 14:38:32 -
Bruce R. Gilson wrote:
[...]
As soon as you put in some cycle-resolving system, you will
downgrade the preferences of some of these 6
On Jul 16, 2008, at 16:53 , James Gilmour wrote:
raphfrk > Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2008 1:48 PM
From: James Gilmour
There is always a trade-off between guaranteed local representation
(small districts) and proportionality (large districts),
whatever the voting system.
Local representation
raphfrk > Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2008 1:48 PM
> > From: James Gilmour
> > There is always a trade-off between guaranteed local representation
> > (small districts) and proportionality (large districts),
> > whatever the voting system.
>
> Local representati
Again, sorry if there are ?'s where there shouldn't be.
From: James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> It is also an unsafe
> assumption that every first preference vote for a
> particular candidate is a "party vote" for that candidate's party.
