On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 11:32 PM, Michael Allan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Raph Frank wrote:
>> Michael Allan wrote:
>> > ... The faults or failings in democracy are located outside of
>> > state institutions. ... The fixes and changes are needed
>> > elsewhere.
>>
>> Right, if the people are org
Raph Frank wrote:
> Michael Allan wrote:
> > ... The faults or failings in democracy are located outside of
> > state institutions. ... The fixes and changes are needed
> > elsewhere.
>
> Right, if the people are organised, they can change the constitution.
That brings to mind organizations like
You make a lot of good points. I can actually see quite a few useful
functions for the kind of temporary issue-specific panels you describe.
For example, they could examine line-items in the budget, and have the
option to approve it, veto it, or send it back with the demand that it be
increased or
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 8:10 PM, Aaron Armitage
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What about
>> one of the
>> the proposed random ballot rules, where if there is
>> consensus, a
>> specific candidate wins. However, if that doesn't
>> work, the winner is
>> random.
>>
>
> I'm not sure I understand. I
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 3:55 PM, Fred Gohlke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The initial phase of the process is dominated by participants with little
> interest in advancing to higher levels. They do not seek public office;
> they simply wish to pursue their private lives in peace. Thus, the most
>
You sound a little bit like an impatient know-it-all yourself.
I already addressed Athens, but to repeat: the central institution of
Athenian democracy was not chosen by sortition but was self-selected. You
might also consider the generals more carefully. If you're concerned about
individuals acqu
c--- On Thu, 9/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] sortition/random legislature Was: Re: language/framing quibble
> To: "Election Methods Mailing List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Thursday, September 11, 2008, 7:00 AM
> Sorry, pressed
Aaron Armitage wrote:
> I don't think I expressed my point clearly enough: I consider that
> making the public the active agents in their own governance is a
> very major benefit of popular government. THE benefit, in fact.
> Increasing the percentage of majority policy preferences enacted, in
>
On 9/11/08, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Why weakest? What is the "weakest of each party's strongest candidates"?
It means find the candidate in each party with the highest vote.
These are the party's stongest candidates.
You then assign the seat to the weakest of them (but only if the part
Good Morning, Terry Bouricius
re: "... I have long advocated a greater use of sortition (the selection
by lot) to select legislators ..."
It seems to me the problem with picking people by lot is that it
provides no means of examining them. I understand that it produces a
random sample of th
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a
> "parallel organization" where (as an example), a group elects a "double
> mayor" and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state
> inside the state. I don't think that's very
I am interested in Aaron's comment on a risk of sortition along these
lines...
"Managing your own affairs is for adults; having your desires catered to
without effort on your part is for spoiled children."
I am sympathetic to this argument. I favor a society in which as many
people as possible a
Good Morning, Raph
When I offered to send you a draft of the petition outlining a method of
selecting candidates for public office, I planned to send it privately.
After seeing your response, I asked the author's permission to post it
publicly and he agreed. Here's the draft in its current f
I think this is definitely on-topic. This is also a good challenge on
how to improve the current political systems. The identified problem
is real and better approaches could be found.
It is natural that people have many kind of motivation to climb up
the ladders of the political system. So
The traditional algorithm complexity research covers usually only
finding perfect/optimal result. I'm particularly interested in how
the value of the result increases as a function of time. It is
possible that even if it would take 100 years to guarantee that one
has found the best solution
Some notes on devolution and subsidiarity.
Maybe one could classify this so that if the real power is and
ultimate decision making happens at some level, then levels above
this level get their decision making power from below, and levels
below this level get their decision making power from
On Sep 5, 2008, at 4:00 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Hello Juho,
using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual
districts
replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
Ok, also that may happen. Each society should pick dimensions that
suit them best. (I'm just lis
On Sep 5, 2008, at 2:26 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple
dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting
from the
ones with strongest support (e.g. best
On Sep 5, 2008, at 2:13 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
One simple approach would be to ask the voters directly about the
(physical/mental) distances. The answers could be of e.g.
Village1>Village2>Village3>... There could be more villages on
Sorry, pressed reply instead of reply to all
On 9/11/08, Aaron Armitage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It doesn't follow from the fact we choose representatives for ourselves
> that we would lose nothing by being stripped of the means of political
> action. We would lose our citizenship, becaus
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