[EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

2008-10-11 Thread Greg Nisbet
Reasons why Range is better and always will be. I would like to end the truce. I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something reasonable like RP, Schulze or River. Property Related: favorite betrayal, participation and consistency. Implications: 1) It is always good to

Re: [EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started t his argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

2008-10-11 Thread Jobst Heitzig
Dear Greg, Reasons why Range is better and always will be. I would like to end the truce. That won't work I guess. Using the term better alone is a major flaw of many discussions here. Obviously, it all depends on what goals a method is expected to achieve. I'll be generous to the

Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score

2008-10-11 Thread Aaron Armitage
I think his point is that he prefers any and all Condorcet methods over IRV, and probably over any non-Condorcet method. I happen to agree. --- On Sat, 10/11/08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score To: EM

Re: [EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

2008-10-11 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hello, --- En date de : Sam 11.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : De: Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] Objet: [EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet) À: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Samedi 11 Octobre 2008, 2h01 Reasons

[EM] Condorcet vs Range (Greg Nisbet)

2008-10-11 Thread Greg Nisbet
Message: 2 Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2008 18:29:48 + (GMT) From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Content-Type: text/plain;

Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score

2008-10-11 Thread Aaron Armitage
Condorcet methods are the application of majority rule to elections which have more than two candidates and which cannot sequester the electorate for however many rounds it takes to produce a majority first-preference winner. If we consider majoritarianism an irreducible part of democracy, then

Re: [EM] Ways to Evaluate Multiwinner Contests (Greg Nisbet)

2008-10-11 Thread Greg Nisbet
small correction: On Sat, Oct 11, 2008 at 6:37 PM, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: So far some nice ideas have been proposed for measuring how effective a multiwinner method is. All of the ones proposed are based on n, let n be a list of utility scores for the candidates. 1.

Re: [EM] Condorcet vs Range (Greg Nisbet)

2008-10-11 Thread Aaron Armitage
I would suggest that majoritarian voting reveals utilities better than simply asking, because having made the effort to show up at the polls at all there is no marginal cost to overstating how much utility (or disutility) you expect from a given outcome. Which is why, as everyone keeps pointing