The ballots are ratings of options in the range from zero to one.
Once the ballots are in, for each option (i) find the total number t(i) of
ballots that rate it above zero, i.e. t(i) is the cardinality of the set {r
in the set of ballots | r(i) > 0}.
The winning option is the option i for whi
I would like to give a name to my entropy method and post another example of
this method in action.
The name is Minimal Expected Lack of Log Satisfaction or MELLS for short.
Here is the example (with ratings in brackets, with w+x+y+z=100%):
v: A1>C1[v/(v+w)]>D[v]
w: A2>C1[w/(v+w)]>D[w]
x: B1>C
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer,
Thanks for at least responding.
"...I won't say anything about the desirability because I don't know
what it implies;.."
Only judging criteria by how they fit in with other criteria is
obviously circular.
That's true. If we're going to judge criteria by h
Raph,
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than half the ballots, then it must not be possible to make B
the winner by altering any of the ballots on wh
Hello,
--- En date de : Ven 28.11.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> By requiring that at least 3 levels are possible, you are
> effectively
> forcing lots of methods to fail.
I'm sure that's the intention, though I'm not sure why. The criterion
wants to limit "cheating" in a sense,
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
"Unmanipulable Majority".
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
I think you have alot of redundant language, is the criterion
effectively the following?
If the winner is preferred to another candidate on the majority of the
ballots, it must not be possible to make any such candidate win by
modifying the ballots where that candidate is preferred to the winner.
Kristofer,
Thanks for at least responding.
"...I won't say anything about the desirability because I don't know what it
implies;.."
Only judging criteria by how they fit in with other criteria is obviously
circular.
Do you (or anyone) think that judged in isolation this strategy criterion