[EM] Another Lottery Based on Scores

2008-11-28 Thread fsimmons
The ballots are ratings of options in the range from zero to one. Once the ballots are in, for each option (i) find the total number t(i) of ballots that rate it above zero, i.e. t(i) is the cardinality of the set {r in the set of ballots | r(i) > 0}. The winning option is the option i for whi

[EM] MELLS (was Cooperation and Entropy in Lotteries)

2008-11-28 Thread fsimmons
I would like to give a name to my entropy method and post another example of this method in action. The name is Minimal Expected Lack of Log Satisfaction or MELLS for short. Here is the example (with ratings in brackets, with w+x+y+z=100%): v: A1>C1[v/(v+w)]>D[v] w: A2>C1[w/(v+w)]>D[w] x: B1>C

Re: [EM] "Unmanipulable Majority" strategy criterion

2008-11-28 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Chris Benham wrote: Kristofer, Thanks for at least responding. "...I won't say anything about the desirability because I don't know what it implies;.." Only judging criteria by how they fit in with other criteria is obviously circular. That's true. If we're going to judge criteria by h

[EM] "Unmanipulable Majority" strategy criterion

2008-11-28 Thread Chris Benham
Raph, *If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more than half the ballots, then it must not be possible to make B the winner by altering any of the ballots on wh

Re: [EM] "Unmanipulable Majority" strategy criterion 2

2008-11-28 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hello, --- En date de : Ven 28.11.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > By requiring that at least 3 levels are possible, you are > effectively > forcing lots of methods to fail. I'm sure that's the intention, though I'm not sure why. The criterion wants to limit "cheating" in a sense,

Re: [EM] "Unmanipulable Majority" strategy criterion

2008-11-28 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Chris, --- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call  "Unmanipulable Majority".   *If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three

Re: [EM] "Unmanipulable Majority" strategy criterion

2008-11-28 Thread Raph Frank
I think you have alot of redundant language, is the criterion effectively the following? If the winner is preferred to another candidate on the majority of the ballots, it must not be possible to make any such candidate win by modifying the ballots where that candidate is preferred to the winner.

[EM] "Unmanipulable Majority" strategy criterion

2008-11-28 Thread Chris Benham
Kristofer, Thanks for at least responding. "...I won't say anything about the desirability because I  don't know what it implies;.." Only judging criteria by how they fit in with other criteria is obviously circular. Do you (or anyone) think that judged in isolation this strategy criterion