There are 65 real single winner elections in OpenSTV Database
(stv.sourceforge.net/stvdb).While the database doesn't list the
individual ballots, it does list the Smith Set for each of these
races. In 63 of these 65 races, there exists a dominant Condorcet
winner (the Smith set has a size of 1).
F
I did some small multiples runs. They kinda look good
> http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20081202/
>
> Brian Olson
> http://bolson.org/
> (Sent from my iPhone)
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--- On Tue, 2/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I think it depends on the society and its rules (and
> the method and election in question) if insincere voting is
> considered to be "wrong" or not. In many cases the
> society will benefit if insincere voting is generally no
This is in a way a positive message. It says
also that people tend to make independent
decisions, and that many such strategic threats
that require coordinated and systematic
behaviour are not dangerous in this kind of
environments.
One reason behind the "non-mathematical" answers
is of course als
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > There are different kind of criteria.
> > If one decides the winner based on one single
> > vote a method that would elect the least
> > preferred candidate would be bad. Things get
> > however more complex with group opini
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
> behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
> request is to mark all candidates that one approves then
> placing the cutoff between two main candidates is often
> in
Hi,
--- En date de : Lun 1.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > > If we must have a
> > > single ballot, and a single winner, period, Range
> Voting is
> > > actually a trick: it is the only relatively
> objective method
> > > of assessing the expected voter satisfaction wi
] Yee/B.Olson Diagrams (YBD's): the next step
To: Raph Frank
Cc: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" , Election Methods Mailing List
> I did some small multiples runs. They kinda look good
> http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20081202/
>
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 08:47 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On the strategy question, if you have any doubts, I recommend that
you spend a couple of hours at a blackjack table, and watch your
fellow players. Most of them have a "system", and while there are
rational blackjack strategies that will minimize y
At 08:36 PM 12/1/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
But seriously, it would be important to extend the experiment to find out
if the respondents would ACT on that pessimistic statement that flies in
the face of probability, or if they were making a mildly humorous
statement as in "I forgot my umbrella,
At 07:19 PM 12/1/2008, Paul Kislanko wrote:
PS. This is what I don't like about approval. In my generalized
voter-friendly ballot, Approval requires me to vote A=B=C=D... when I really
like A a lot better than the others. But that method doesn't have any way
for me (the voter) to tell it that I d
On Dec 2, 2008, at 5:55 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:30 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't really see a need for equal-ranking in a single-winner
election. As a voter, I'm answering the question "if you were
dictator, of this set of candidates, who would you choose?". I don'
Hi,
--- En date de : Lun 1.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
I initially wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > --- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > I don't understand how you reconcile the two ideas
> here. Range is
> > "objective" and
At 06:38 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 30, 2008, at 9:44 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
It certainly is not an expression of "approval," hence I have often
stated that ballot instructions for voters should not use the word
"Approve." The instructions *might* use the word "accept,
At 06:30 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't really see a need for equal-ranking in a single-winner
election. As a voter, I'm answering the question "if you were
dictator, of this set of candidates, who would you choose?". I don't
really need the option of naming two candidates to the
Hi,
--- En date de : Dim 30.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Hello,
> >
> > --- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > > What Approval sincerely represents from a voter
> is a
> > > *decision* as to where to place an Approval
At 06:15 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Dec 1, 2008, at 10:31 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
That's correct. We can make some reasonable assumptions, though. We
can look at Plurality elections and look at how many voters vote for
minor candidates with no hope of winning. We can then lo
At 03:34 AM 12/1/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Range and Approval might not be insincere (if we accept your
definition), but they still require voters to use strategy - that
is, to keep the votes of others in mind when they're voting. In
Approval in particular, this is very important (con
I did some small multiples runs. They kinda look good
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20081202/
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
(Sent from my iPhone)
On Dec 2, 2008, at 9:28 AM, "Raph Frank" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Ultimately, there are more degrees of freedom than
At 01:21 PM 11/26/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
"Unmanipulable Majority".
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted a
On Dec 2, 2008, at 1:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Yes. Preference can be determined, generally, rather easily, by one
of two methods. The first method is pairwise comparison. With a
series of pairwise comparisons, we can construct a rank order.
Usually. It's possible, because different
At 02:47 PM 11/27/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
For ordinal systems, it's pretty easy to consider what a honest
ballot would be, assuming a transitive individual preference. "If A
is better than B, A should be higher ranked than B". It's not so
obvious for cardinal systems. What do the po
At 06:17 PM 11/26/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
(Which is why I'm partial to ordinal systems; it seems to me that I as
a voter can pretty easily order candidates without considering
strategy, whereas the decision of where to draw the line for Approval,
or how to assign cardinal values to candida
At 04:50 PM 11/26/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
I think it depends on the society and its rules (and the method and
election in question) if insincere voting is considered to be
"wrong" or not. In many cases the society will benefit if insincere
voting is generally not accepted. (Strategic voting can
Good Afternoon, Dave
Your recitation of the history of the Green Party in New York is typical
of efforts to create political alternatives. In my view, we will be
better served when we forget labels like Left and Right and Green and
Liberal and Conservative and devote our energy to seeking out
At 12:40 PM 11/26/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I want to add to this by saying that if Approval is about approval,
well, then discussions about frontrunner plus strategies won't
capture the intent or point of the method. If the statement for
Approval voting is "vote for those you like",
At 08:03 AM 11/26/2008, Michael Poole wrote:
(I may not have separated this out correctly, attribution may be
incorrect. Paragraphing and quotations were largely lost, somewhere
in email formatting.)
Jonathan Lundell writes:
"Sincere" is a term of art in this context, not a
> value judgeme
At 12:35 PM 11/26/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This (TTR vs IRV) is a matter that we can simply disagree on.
Give it some time. Below, you indicate that you are "partial to the
iterative process." So -- why not iterative process in public
elections? It can be done, you know, the claim of im
On Dec 2, 2008, at 10:11 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote regarding Approval voting strategy:
"It's also obvious that if, for whatever reason, I vote for
candidate X, I
should vote for all the candidates that I prefer to X."
I note that Jonathan said the voter "should," rat
Jonathan Lundell wrote regarding Approval voting strategy:
"It's also obvious that if, for whatever reason, I vote for candidate X, I
should vote for all the candidates that I prefer to X."
I note that Jonathan said the voter "should," rather than "would," which
is an important distinction...
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 27, 2008, at 11:47 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I guess what I'm trying to say is that the problem of discerning a
honest vote from a strategic (optimizing) one seems to be inherent to
all cardinal methods, because we can't read voters' minds. That is,
On Dec 2, 2008, at 3:25 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Paul Kislanko wrote:
I agree with almost all of what Jonathan says except that "as a
voter" (and
that's my main perspective) I _CAN_ see a need for equal rankings
in a
method that requests my ordinal list of alternatives.
A>B=C=D=..
Ultimately, there are more degrees of freedom than a 2d picture can
show. If you hold one of the candidates fixed and let the other two
be placed anywhere, then you have four degrees of freedom. However,
one of those degrees of freedom can be dropped due to rotational
symmetry.
This gives the sa
Disorganized thoughts:
Standard deviation could be considered to be interchangeable with the
spacing between the choices.
Wider spacing is equivalent to tighter standard deviation.
I keep imagining a way to explain this as starting with a blank black
space and colored dots representing the
Sorry, forgot to hit reply all.
I think that people have enough trouble understanding the basic
diagrams without adding more complexity.
OTOH, it would be interesting to be able to give the chance of failure
for each method, rather than just showing a few examples of failures.
Otherwise, you can
Paul Kislanko wrote:
I agree with almost all of what Jonathan says except that "as a voter" (and
that's my main perspective) I _CAN_ see a need for equal rankings in a
method that requests my ordinal list of alternatives.
A>B=C=D=...>V>W=...X=Y=Z
fairly precisely expresses what I was thinking
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
...or at least to avoid methods that encourage strategic voting, is that
voters are so bad at it.
I blogged a rather dismaying study the other day on the subject of
people's tendency to irrationally misjudge probabilities when they have
a stake in the outcome. I wouldn
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