Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 02:14 AM 1/13/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote: For instance in Aspen CO's most recent IRV election, if 75 *fewer* voters had voted for one candidate that candidate would have won. that's a pathology (and sounds like a worse one than Burlington VT in 2009). so let's get rid of it. but *

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Dave Ketchum
Ok, there are multiple topics. Any voter can want secrecy and, if so, should have that protection so that the voter can vote as preferred without risking problems with enemies. You write often about a different class of voters who do not want such secrecy. While not convinced of the valu

Re: [EM] Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairer than IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws

2010-01-13 Thread Kathy Dopp
On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 8:55 PM, wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >        election-meth...@lists.electorama.com > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >         > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 07:10 PM 1/11/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote: The possible excitement tangles with the secrecy laws - reporting in a manner that identifies how ANY ONE voter voted needs preventing (needed protection of voters). There is a problem with ranked ballots and true write-in votes: a voter may identify

Re: [EM] Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairer than IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws

2010-01-13 Thread Brian Olson
On Jan 13, 2010, at 8:06 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: > 1. A rank choice ballot method: > > Any number of candidates may be running for office and any number > allowed to be ranked on the ballot. > > Voter ranks one candidate vote =1 > > Voter ranks two candidates, denominator is 1+2 = 3 > votes are wo

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Jonathan Lundell
On Jan 13, 2010, at 5:02 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > On Jan 13, 2010, at 7:57 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote: > >> On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: >> >>> On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote: On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > it s

[EM] Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairer than IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws

2010-01-13 Thread Kathy Dopp
For those who need a system for substituting for a top-two runoff election, I devised two fair methods to suggest to her that do not have all the flaws of IRV/STV. (They both may've been devised by others before me. My goal was to create a fair method without IRV/STV's flaws which solve the problem

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread robert bristow-johnson
On Jan 13, 2010, at 7:57 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote: On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and proponents of electio

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Jonathan Lundell
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: > On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote: >> On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >> >>> it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and >>> proponents of election reform thunked up the idea to have a ranke

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote: On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and proponents of election reform thunked up the idea to have a ranked- order ballot and then took that good idea and married it to

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 01:19 PM 1/11/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote: Plurality does that only when you vote for one who has a possibility of winning. Sometimes doing that prevents voting for the one you prefer but expect to lose. There is an aspect of this which is often overlooked, amidst assumptions about what voter

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 09:30 AM 1/13/2010, Terry Bouricius wrote: Juho, That was a good summary of IRV and Condorcet dynamics, and how their different weaknesses might be perceived by a citizenry. I would like to add one more to your list. Different voting systems provide different incentives for candidate behavio

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Terry Bouricius
Juho, That was a good summary of IRV and Condorcet dynamics, and how their different weaknesses might be perceived by a citizenry. I would like to add one more to your list. Different voting systems provide different incentives for candidate behavior and campaigns and thus voter information.

Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality

2010-01-13 Thread Juho
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and proponents of election reform thunked up the idea to have a ranked- order ballot and then took that good idea and married it to the IRV protocol. with the 200 year ol