Hi Juho,
I don't have much to add except on one point.
--- En date de : Mer 14.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> >> I think I did. For example sincere 49: A>B, 49:
> C>D,
> >> 1: D>B could be one such example. WV elects D,
> and that
> >> could be considered less than perfect performance
> with
> >> sincer
If we had a method that chose the winner on the basis of all possible
candidates, rather than just the actual candidates, then the method would
satisfy the IIAC, because any loser that was removed would automatically be
replaced with a virtual candidate at the same position in issue space.
Eight o
Arrow's Theorem is grossly misunderstood, because people have the mistaken
impression that the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion (IIAC)
is on a par with the other criteria he mentions in his theorem.
To clear this up, let's consider the following theorem which is the essence of
A
On Apr 15, 2010, at 9:46 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
There has been some interesting writing about disputes over the
value of
"rational choice" theory, especially as applied to voting. Since a
single
voter's vote has almost no chance of having any impact, it is
rational to
avoid the burden
Hallo,
here is an interesting paper by Ron Rivest:
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestShen-AnOptimalSingleWinnerPreferentialVotingSystemBasedOnGameTheory.pdf
He gets to the conclusion that the Schulze
method is "nearly perfect" (page 12).
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing lis
I'm trying only to post on the election science foundation re this
topic, so please look there:
http://groups.google.com/group/electionsciencefoundation
There are a lot of developments there.
However since I see a bunch of comments built up at electorama, I will
try to process them now a bit and
Michael, Frank, Fred, et. al.
I have changed the subject line for this epicyclical discussion on why
voters vote.
There has been some interesting writing about disputes over the value of
"rational choice" theory, especially as applied to voting. Since a single
voter's vote has almost no chance
> > ... Consider these two facts:
> >
> > 1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition. In a
> > typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the
> > result. The effect is exactly zero.
> >
> > 2. Voters nevertheless turn out in large numbers.
> >
> > It follows
