Re: [EM] Paper by Ron Rivest

Hallo, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (16 April 2010): > I'm curious now as to how often, say, Ranked > Pairs would disagree with GT/GTD/GTS. Do you > consider the GT agreement a worthwhile metric, > i.e. that (absent criteria problems) methods > closer to GT are better? I don't like probabilistic

Re: [EM] Paper by Ron Rivest

Markus Schulze wrote: Hallo, here is an interesting paper by Ron Rivest: http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestShen-AnOptimalSingleWinnerPreferentialVotingSystemBasedOnGameTheory.pdf He gets to the conclusion that the Schulze method is "nearly perfect" (page 12). I'm curious now as to how

Re: [EM] MMPO revisited

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Kristopher, Thanks for your interest. Yes, MMTD also elects C in your scenario. But that is no problem in the context that I have in mind for MMTD, namely allowing all nominated lotteries into the competition. In this case an obvious lottery to include is (A+B)/2 .

Re: [EM] How to get closer to the impossible ideal of the IIAC

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: If we had a method that chose the winner on the basis of all possible candidates, rather than just the actual candidates, then the method would satisfy the IIAC, because any loser that was removed would automatically be replaced with a virtual candidate at the same positio

Re: [EM] How close can we get to the IIAC

fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Schulze's CSSD (Beatpath) method does not satisfy the IIAC, but it does satisfy all of Arrow's other criteria, that is to say all of the reasonable ones plus some others like Clone Independence, Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives, etc. We cannot hold the IIA

[EM] Paper by Ron Rivest

> here is an interesting paper by Ron Rivest: > > http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestShen-AnOptimalSingleWinnerPreferentialVotingSystemBasedOnGameTheory.pdf Very interesting paper. It contains a very good rationale for using a random election method (when there is a Condorcet cycle). The

Re: [EM] Condorcet How? JL

On Apr 16, 2010, at 4:42 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote: Ok I see. A3 has no claim over A1 just from the bullet vote. So assume it's A3>C2. In that case according to your analysis, the A candidates collectively beat B and C, Only A3 beats the B and C candidates, not all A candidates, no "collectiv