2010/5/8 Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
Jameson,
I'll respond to your three points...but understand, I am not on FairVote's
board, nor an employee (though I am sometimes paid as a consulting policy
analyst), so the responses are my understanding of FairVote's positions,
with
Dear Andrew Myers,
this method looks interesting, as it is proportional, Condorcet and non
STV-like.
You write on your web-page, that: the correctness of the algorithm depends
on a currently unproved conjecture: that if improvement of a committee is
possible, it can be done by replacing one
Dear all,
A mathematically more sound notation of the importance of the functions of
the council members would be the following:
M1M2=M3M4=M5=M6=M7, where Mn is a member of the set of all council
members.
instead of P[VPa, VPb][Ma, Mb, Mc, Md].
The unified method is called Schulze generalized
Dear all,
have the properties of hybrid or generalized ranking/approval ballots been
examined?
A hybrid/generalized ranking/approval ballot is a ballot, with where the
voter ranks the candidates by either or = without any other restrictions.
Say we have seven candidates ABCDEFG.
Say the voter
Dear all
If we study Condorcet voting with the two types of ballots: ranked and
hybrid, then the differences can be drastic:
Normal ranked ballots:
30 BCA
30 ACB
1 C (i.e. CA=B, when using Schulze, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Ballot)
1 CBA
Pairwise preferences
A B C
A 30 30
Peter,
Thanks for your comments. I'll address them inline.
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear Andrew Myers,
this method looks interesting, as it is proportional, Condorcet and non
STV-like.
You write on your web-page, that: the correctness of the algorithm
depends on a
Dear Peter Zbornik,
you wrote (9 May 2010):
In your paper schulze3.pdf, there are some instances,
where the Schulze proportional ranking fails to produce
an unambiguous ordering (see for instance the result
for data set A10). Why do there ambiguities occur and
how would you recommend them
Dear all,
an alternative way to count wins against equally ranked candidates,
would be to give both 0.5 wins per vote and not 0 as I did in my previous
mail.
Thus the current state: AB gives 1:0. A=B gives ?:? (A=B is only allowed at
the end of the ballot)
The proposal above: AB gives 2:0. A=B
On May 9, 2010, at 1:52 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On May 8, 2010, at 2:14 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so Terry, in 2009 Burlington, did 495 of 1513 voters that marked
their ballots as WMK (perhaps with some other candidates in
between) experience LNH?
i misremembered a number.
On May 9, 2010, at 1:52 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On May 8, 2010, at 2:14 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so Terry, in 2009 Burlington, did 495 of 1513 voters that marked
their ballots as WMK (perhaps with some other candidates in
between) experience LNH?
i misremembered a number.
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: election-methods Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] piling on against IRV
In truth, IRV and STV are an enormous step *down* from existing
plurality voting,
...
IRV/STV also finds majority winners far
Hi Peter,
We consider rank ballots that allow equality of ranking and truncation all
the time.
For Condorcet methods the question of how to treat equality of ranking is
what Juho and I usually talk about.
If Markus prefers not to use the split vote treatment it is probably
because it violates
Dear Markus Schulze,
You wrote On Sun, May 9, 2010 at 6:59 PM:
I recommend that you should solve indecisive situations by using the
numbers of the member ID cards of the candidates.
we have member ID cards, and each of them has a number.
I guess we could give the oldest member of the party the
On May 9, 2010, at 6:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
an alternative way to count wins against equally ranked candidates,
would be to give both 0.5 wins per vote and not 0 as I did in my
previous mail.
Thus the current state: AB gives 1:0. A=B gives ?:? (A=B is only
allowed at the end of the
thanks, Juho, for this summary.
On May 9, 2010, at 2:24 PM, Juho wrote:
All classical Condorcet methods can handle equal rankings and their
impact has been analyzed quite well.
Usually the discussion focuses on how to measure the strength of the
pairwise preferences. This is the next
2010/5/9 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
in comparison, i have seen 3 different TTR elections for City Council in
Burlington. none had more than 55% turnout on runoff day (in comparison to
the number of voters that came on the first election day). the IRV election
had 93%
Date: Sun, 9 May 2010 13:30:38 -0600
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
Cc: election-methods Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] piling on against IRV
Message-ID:
Oops. Sorry. I see I'm wrong again (to save you the trouble Robert). I
see you did say 55% of the original turnout on election day numbers,
so I see your point is valid. Sorry, I'm trying to go too fast and
get onto other things.
However, that does not alter the fact that the voters have the
At 01:42 PM 5/9/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 9, 2010, at 12:29 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
[Kathy Dopp had written:]
In truth, IRV and STV are an enormous step *down* from existing
plurality voting,
...
IRV/STV also finds
On May 9, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
It's just me and some others that have said that margins
seems at least more natural than winning votes (not
necessarily ideal).
Ok, good. I just want to be clear on who is saying this.
Are you saying that winning votes are more natural? (or
On May 9, 2010, at 11:22 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 9, 2010, at 2:24 PM, Juho wrote:
On May 9, 2010, at 6:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
an alternative way to count wins against equally ranked candidates,
would be to give both 0.5 wins per vote and not 0 as I did in my
previous mail.
At 03:30 PM 5/9/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/5/9 robert bristow-johnson
mailto:r...@audioimagination.comr...@audioimagination.com
in comparison, i have seen 3 different TTR elections for City
Council in Burlington. none had more than 55% turnout on runoff day
(in comparison to the number
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 9.5.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
It's just me and some others that have said that
margins
seems at least more natural than winning votes
(not
necessarily ideal).
Ok, good. I just want to be clear on who is saying
this.
Are you saying that
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 9.5.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
You have to give me a reason why I should start with
margins or else it won't occur to me.
See (***) below. That's my best guess on why someone might
like margins.
I didn't really understand your point below. My
--- En date de : Dim 9.5.10, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
smallest defeat? Oops - I will quote from wikipedia:
Ranked Pairs and Schulze are procedurally in some sense opposite approaches
(although they very frequently give the same results):
Ranked Pairs (and its
On May 9, 2010, at 8:57 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how about expanding the definition of Later-No-Harm (can we find a name for
it?) to include later harming one's political interest (not *just* their
favorite candidate) by sincerely voting their conscience?
That's called
On May 9, 2010, at 3:30 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/5/9 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
in comparison, i have seen 3 different TTR elections for City
Council in Burlington. none had more than 55% turnout on runoff day
(in comparison to the number of voters that came
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