At 12:31 AM 5/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
As Abd already said, you can avoid the runoff if only one candidate
has a majority. Abd's Bucklin proposal tricks many voters into
extending more approvals to decrease the chances of a runoff.
Tricks? I don't know if the runoff will cause voters to a
On May 27, 2010, at 12:12 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:03 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 26, 2010, at 8:19 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
[about IRV]
Backers make a big deal of "majority" - but it is of the final
stacks, not of all ballots.
what it is, is *a* majority.
All three methods sound OK to me.
On Thu, May 27, 2010 at 12:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> This method is precinct-summable. One-round results can be done easily on
>> any equipment that exists, and/or by hand easily. The process for finding
>> who is in the runoff described above could also b
On May 27, 2010, at 4:07 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho a écrit :
The following criterion is similar to
Plurality. Does
it have a name?
If the number of ballots on which X beats
Y is
greater than
the number of
ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y
c
> This method is precinct-summable. One-round results can be done easily on
> any equipment that exists, and/or by hand easily. The process for finding
> who is in the runoff described above could also be done on even the most
> antiquated equipment by running the ballots through once per viable
>
2010/5/26 Kathy Dopp
> Abd ul,
>
> I agree with virtually everything you say here. However, I would also
> consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
> "approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
> runoff of the top two vote getters". It solves so
At 10:03 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 26, 2010, at 8:19 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
[about IRV]
Backers make a big deal of "majority" - but it is of the final
stacks, not of all ballots.
what it is, is *a* majority. for a particular pair that is left
standing after the
At 10:39 PM 5/26/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Yes. I agree with your scenario of not needing a runoff Abd ul.
You get the basic system you suggested simply by changing the line in
the election code that prohibits counting more votes for an office
than there are office-holders to be elected. One vo
Abd, your avalanche of words makes it a losing battle to sort out the
fallacies from the gems, much less to respond to both. There are gems, but
no time. So, top fallacies:
2010/5/26 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> At 01:45 PM 5/26/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> This method is very simple. I think that
2010/5/26 Kevin Venzke
> --- En date de : Mar 25.5.10, Jameson Quinn a
> écrit :
> What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
> ...
>
> -IRV: Voting can hurt you (nonmonotonicity). ...
> http://zesty.ca/voting/voteline/ ...
>
> ^
> I don't call this problem nonmonotonicity...
> ^
>
Yes. I agree with your scenario of not needing a runoff Abd ul.
On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 9:47 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
wrote:
> At 09:33 PM 5/26/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>
>> Abd ul,
>>
>> I agree with virtually everything you say here.
>
> Thanks.
>
>> However, I would also
>> consider that an ex
On May 26, 2010, at 8:19 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
At least some should see what I write here about IRV vs Condorcet.
Both use ranked ballots, with almost identical rules for voters
(Condorcet permits equal ranking).
assuming that few voters would make equal rankings if allowed to (a
big
At 09:33 PM 5/26/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Abd ul,
I agree with virtually everything you say here.
Thanks.
However, I would also
consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
"approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
runoff of the top two vote g
At 01:45 PM 5/26/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
This method is very simple. I think that the description above,
without the parentheses, is simple and intuitive; it uses only
concrete terms. It is also very easy for a voter to sort candidates
into three rankings; I'd argue that this is the easies
Abd ul,
I agree with virtually everything you say here. However, I would also
consider that an excellent system for electing one winner would be
"approval, every voter votes for up to two candidates, followed by a
runoff of the top two vote getters". It solves some of the problems
of a simple run
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho a écrit :
> The following criterion is similar to
> >> Plurality. Does
> it have a name?
>
> If the number of ballots on which X beats
> Y is
> >> greater than
> the number of
> ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y
> cann
On May 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho a écrit :
The following criterion is similar to
Plurality. Does
it have a name?
If the number of ballots on which X beats Y is
greater than
the number of
ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y can
At 02:30 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Clay Shentrup needs to get on this list and start
defending his position rather than expecting me to do the same on his
list.
Clay, by the way, needs nothing of the kind. He has better stuff to
do, and he's doing it. He's now in this for the
At 02:30 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy
from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.
I responded to an email; got a complaint that I misspoke,
Misspoke? I thought I was moderator? I am - of NY; email was on NYS.
At least some should see what I write here about IRV vs Condorcet.
Both use ranked ballots, with almost identical rules for voters
(Condorcet permits equal rankin
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho a écrit :
> >> The following criterion is similar to
> Plurality. Does
> >> it have a name?
> >>
> >> If the number of ballots on which X beats Y is
> greater than
> >> the number of
> >> ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y cannot be
> elected.
>
>
On May 27, 2010, at 1:43 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Mar 25.5.10, fsimm...@pcc.edu a
écrit :
The following criterion is similar to Plurality. Does
it have a name?
If the number of ballots on which X beats Y is greater than
the number of
ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y ca
Hi Jameson,
I can't easily quote this message so I'll put my comments between symbols.
--- En date de : Mar 25.5.10, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy from a large
minority, or even
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> Later-No-Harm is an offensive criterion. It's really a
> voting strategy, and reasonable *if* the voter has strong
> preference, and not if the voter doesn't.
I didn't really understand this. If LNHarm is a voting strategy, t
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Mar 25.5.10, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> Kevin,
>
> The following criterion is similar to Plurality. Does
> it have a name?
>
> If the number of ballots on which X beats Y is greater than
> the number of
> ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y cannot be elected.
>
One problem is that Wikipedia should not contain original research (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:No_original_research
). Many topics on the EM list fall in the original research category.
In principle one should first publish all new material in some
"reliable source" first (more rel
2010/5/26 Alex Rollin
>
>
> On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 8:37 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> Maybe? And then, perhaps a reading guide to each of the methods, and
>>> perhaps use cases for different methods with clues about context?
>>>
>>
>> Maybe. Published where, for what audience?
>>
>>
> Well, i
2010/5/26 Alex Rollin
> Everyone on this list is so brilliant! I am so glad that you guys are such
> experts on all these methods, most of which I was totally unaware of before
> listening in here.
>
> That said, I did a tiny little bit of homework when I joined so I might be
> more receptive to
On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
-Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy
from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.
except some unnamed folks here (whose posts i don't
Everyone on this list is so brilliant! I am so glad that you guys are such
experts on all these methods, most of which I was totally unaware of before
listening in here.
That said, I did a tiny little bit of homework when I joined so I might be
more receptive to the lists blinding insights. The
>
> This method is very simple. I think that the description above, without
>> the parentheses, is simple and intuitive; it uses only concrete terms. It is
>> also very easy for a voter to sort candidates into three rankings; I'd argue
>> that this is the easiest possible ballot task, easier in ge
At 01:20 PM 5/25/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
-Bucklin: Bucklin (with equal rankings, of course) doesn't really
have a single biggest weakness. It is still technically just as
vulnerable to divisiveness as approval; but the trappings tend t
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