Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

On Nov 13, 2010, at 10:07 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote: On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Dave Ketchum > wrote: Actually, "differs from plurality" is not a sure indication of failure for ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet. For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate. David, Not sure why

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: > Actually, "differs from plurality" is not a sure indication of failure for > ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet. > > For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate. David, Not sure why you are restating the obvious.You also are mi

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

Actually, "differs from plurality" is not a sure indication of failure for ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet. For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate. For ranking, voter can vote for more than one, perhaps ranking most desired over more gettable. Condorcet will use all t

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

> Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 13 Nov 2010 22:17:49 +0200 > From: Juho > To: Election Methods > Subject: Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots > Message-ID: <8c9f038f-e57b-4589-a102-41b7a91bf...@yahoo.co.uk> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed"; >        DelSp="yes" >

Re: [EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

- Original Message - From: "C.Benham" Date: Saturday, November 13, 2010 11:20 am Subject: My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC To: em Cc: Forest W Simmons > Regarding my example > > 31: A>B > 32: B>C > 37: C>A > > Forest: > > > > >I've come around to the belief

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

Bob Richard wrote: On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Sand W wrote: Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table Perata (or maybe someone in

[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

Regarding my example 31: A>B 32: B>C 37: C>A Forest: > > >I've come around to the belief that most Condorcet cycles in > ordinary elections > >are artificial, so chances are that this cycle was created from > the burial of B > >by the C faction. Giving C the win only rewards this manipulation. >

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

On Nov 13, 2010, at 1:37 PM, Bob Richard wrote: I believe that the DemoChoice numbers you cite are from the first results file, released on November 5. The data below was released on November 10 and includes nearly all of the ballots (although the audit hasn't started yet). You are correct

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

I believe that the DemoChoice numbers you cite are from the first results file, released on November 5. The data below was released on November 10 and includes nearly all of the ballots (although the audit hasn't started yet). You are correct that my totals for Quan and Perata should match the

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

On Nov 13, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Bob Richard wrote: On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Sand W wrote: Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

On Nov 13, 2010, at 12:55 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: This reads as a valuable demonstration of the value of Condorcet. it would be even more informative if, in the semi-final round between Perata, Quan, and Kaplan, we knew how the 2nd-choice votes of Perata and Quan voters broke down. perha

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Sand W wrote: Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table Perata (or maybe someone in his camp) accuses the

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

This reads as a valuable demonstration of the value of Condorcet. Here we have the pro- & anti- Perata halves of Oakland competing. If they win, the anti-Perata half are also competing as to their minor differences. This is only intelligent competition, NOT gaming. In IRV, order of proces

Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

Sand W wrote: Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table Perata (or maybe someone in his camp) accuses the other candidates of "gaming the system" by promoting

[EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots

Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table Perata (or maybe someone in his camp) accuses the other candidates of "gaming the system" by promoting each other as 2nd choices. Some challengers tried to do that to IRV-leader Kriss Wo

Re: [EM] Why I Think Sincere Cycles are Extremely Unlikely in Practice

robert bristow-johnson wrote: On Nov 12, 2010, at 3:57 PM, Juho wrote: Sincere cycles are probably not very common in real elections. There have already been many ranked ballot based elections with reasonably sincere ballots, but at least I'm not aware of any top level cycles in them. i ha