On 29.5.2011, at 3.53, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.
Kevin Venzke referred to the number of disappointed voters on the winning side
(that will be overruled in the case of a top cycle). That's one concern. I have
some problems
On 29.5.2011, at 5.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Margins elects A here:
35 AB
25 B
40 C
Is this going to be defensible when this method is
proposed? Can you
argue a case for A without mindreading off of the
Dear all,
please let me just add an extension of the proposed generalized ballot
completion in my email below.
Adding blank votes amounts to enabling the voter express zero preferences.
Leaving out candidates from the ranking allows for negative preferences.
However the negative preferences are
Date: Sun, 29 May 2011 02:42:44 +0100 (BST)
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Remember toby
In the easy to explain/solve but still Condorcet category, I am okay
with Minmax(WV) but I think Condorcet//Approval (with implied approval)
On 29.5.2011, at 16.06, Peter Zbornik wrote:
On the other hand I might rather prefer My Political Opponent to be elected
than Pol Pot.
Thus a ballot on the form AXMy Political OpponentPol Pot, might be a good
idea to allow.
I like this kind of explicit cutoffs more than implicit ones (at
Hi Kathy,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com a écrit :
In the easy to explain/solve but still Condorcet
category, I am okay
with Minmax(WV) but I think Condorcet//Approval (with
implied approval)
is preferable because you don't need a defeat strength
concept at
