> On Jun 29, 2011, at 3:52 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>
> > This is a three slot method. The two non-blank choices are
> > "tolerable" and
> > "better."
> >
> > Elect the alternative that is marked tolerable or better on
> the
> > greatest number
> > of ballots.
> >
> > If there is a tie, then
my premise, poorly articulated, but my premise nonetheless is that an
"adaptive" voting method that takes into account voters' previous behavior
may be able to outperform OMOV in the long run on average.
P=NP is only meant to evoke the relevant properties of objective truth i.e.
that it is true or
What about strategy for "Most Tolerable of Better?"
In ordinary Approval, the strategy S that maximizes the probability of being
pivotal (in the desired direction) is to approve alternative X if and only if X
is less likely to be tied with an alternative that you prefer over X than it is
with an a
Yes, you can think of it as upside down MCA, which is a three slot version of
Bucklin.
- Original Message -
From: robert bristow-johnson
>
> On Jun 29, 2011, at 3:52 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>
> > This is a three slot method. The two non-blank choices are
> > "tolerable" and
> > "bette
>
> Having considered these issues, there are two refinements I'd
> make to SODA:
>
> - If, after voting, one candidate has an absolute majority OR
> is the only
> possible winner, they win immediately.
>
> Sure, I can think an argument for why SODA should elect someone
> who's not
> the initial ma
On Jun 29, 2011, at 3:52 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
This is a three slot method. The two non-blank choices are
"tolerable" and
"better."
Elect the alternative that is marked tolerable or better on the
greatest number
of ballots.
If there is a tie, then elect the tied alternative that is
Problem: "Near-clones" A1 and A2 have both put each other at the top of
their delegation order. Their totals, combined, constitute a majority, but
either one alone would be beaten by B. Both insist that the other one
delegate, threatening to refuse to delegate. It's a game of "chicken", and
the mor
This is a three slot method. The two non-blank choices are "tolerable" and
"better."
Elect the alternative that is marked tolerable or better on the greatest number
of ballots.
If there is a tie, then elect the tied alternative that is marked better on the
greatest number of ballots.
If a tie p
Greg Nisbet wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet's_jury_theorem
Let's pretend for the moment that we are attempting to determine the
truth of propositions rather than deciding on policy (this matters,
since policy decisions can't be objectively right or wrong and alters
what the "credib
i'm selecting smaller segments to respond to. i might select another
small segment.
On Jun 29, 2011, at 2:39 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Winning Votes has *no* salience attached to how close or
decisive an election is. i just cannot get past
that. a measure of how decisive an election is, i
It seems that quite typically different viewpoints on margins and winning votes
are linked to the question of implicit approval. If someone votes A>B, does he
say that his preference order is A>B>C=D=E or does he say that in addition to
that he thinks that only A and B are acceptable and the oth
Jameson Quinn wrote:
ps. I, too, would be interested if anyone had any vaguely pairwise data
on historic US presidential elections, including '92.
There's data (historians' estimates) for the 1860 election in the paper
"Would the Borda Count have avoided the Civil War?",
http://mason.gmu.edu
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