On 6.7.2011, at 6.42, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:14 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end
up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail
2011/7/6 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
Jameson,
I have become confused about one point of operation in SODA. Take this
scenario:
35 ABC
34 BCA
31 CAB
If A delegates to A,B then does B have 69 votes he can delegate to B,C or
does he have only 34 he can play with?
In other
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
...I eventually realized I was kidding myself to think that those
schemes will ever see the light of day in major public elections. What
is the limit of complexity that the general public will accept on a
large scale? I don't know, but I have my doubts
Yes, you are right!
Now I would like to suggest a way to make this method clone proof:
The key is to use the solid coalition structure of the factions to determine
the sequential order of play
(i.e. delegation), from largest coalition to smallest. I believe that
completely solves the
2011/7/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
By the way, when the delegations are done sequentially, the optimum
strategy for each player is
(generically) deterministic. No mixed strategies are needed to get optimum
game theoretic results.
Yes, that's the point.
Because of this, a DSV (Delegated Strategy
Therefore, we finally have a monotone, clone free, DSV that
takes rankings
as input, and puts out
rationally determined approval ballots.
Well, you'd have to impute the most popular ranking among a
candidate'svoters to the candidate, and either use some direct
approval strategy
