Hi Jameson,
Just passing through at the moment. I read this though and wanted to
comment.
--- En date de : Ven 5.8.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
>In the end, I definitely sympathize with Warren that BR is the best
>measure of results ...
I am finding myself looking at utility less because it doe
I know that Kevin is using four levels (zero through three) to test various
methods, so here's an idea:
1. Find the number of votes at each level for each candidate.
2. If any candidates have scores of "one" on more than fifty percent of the
ballots, convert the surplus "ones" to "twos."
3 If
Last night I realized that my example below shows that my variant of DSC fails
later-no-harm.
> Here's an example that illustrates the difference in Woodall's
> DSC and my modified version:
>
> 25 A1>A2
> 35 A2>A1
> 20 B>A1
> 20 C>A1
In my modification of
DSC A1 wins. If the A2 faction trunc
2011/8/9 Juho Laatu
> I checked the definition of SODA at the wiki page. Since the method
> consists of multiple phases and has many rules, it was difficult to find a
> simple mapping from that to one simple claim that could be proved or
> falsified. I also had some problems with terms semi-hones
I checked the definition of SODA at the wiki page. Since the method consists of
multiple phases and has many rules, it was difficult to find a simple mapping
from that to one simple claim that could be proved or falsified. I also had
some problems with terms semi-honest, non-semi-honest, self-re
>> Well... good question. I don't know the answer. Perhaps the answer
>> is some computer simulation study, but that isn't so easy nor will it
>> necessarily be so clear (people will
>> complain: "why didn't your study include voting method X?").
>>
>>
> Can you expand on how you'd design that s
Here's what Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) had to say about people who
denied the possibility of strategically-induced Condorcet cycles:
I am quite prepared to be told, with regard to the cases I have here
proposed, as I have already been told with regard to others, "Oh, that is an
extreme case,
well, I feel intuitively that Jameson is probably right about SODA
being pretty unstrategic
in practice, but there is the annoying problem that there are various
example elections in which dishonest SODA strategic voting is called
for. So, Jameson asks how we can
define some rigorous sense in whic
SODA is not strategy free. Even if you make the assumption that candidate
preferences are honest because dishonesty will be detected and punished by
voters -- an assumption which puts the system beyond the reach of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite proof -- the fact remains that you can construct
strategic
Just another example vote set FYI.
2 AB
2 AC
1 B
1 C
4 D
Natural winners are maybe A and D.
100 AB
100 AC
1 B
1 C
4 D
Natural winners are maybe B and C. Is it a problem that additional support to A
(and B and C) meant that A was not elected?
(A was top ranked by all the new voters. B and C we
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