Hallo,
> Not quite what I'm looking for. That section describes
> a non-deterministic method for generating a complete
> linear order.
Well, although this tie-breaking strategy is _formulated_
as a random tie-breaker, it is almost always decisive.
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing l
FYI, the Condorcet-Kemeny method correctly ranks M1 as second-most
popular, and M2 as third-most popular. And it does so without the need
for a "tie-breaker" adjustment.
Richard Fobes
On 10/27/2011 8:46 PM, capologist wrote:
I recently conducted a vote under the Schwartz method. It produced
On 10/25/2011 11:08 PM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Thanks for telling us about the poll after it concludes! The winner,
IRV, is 1 of the worst voting systems. The best choice in the poll is Approval
Voting.
The survey results (with the raw ballot info copied below) reveal that
IRV supp
> See section 5 of my paper:
Not quite what I'm looking for. That section describes a non-deterministic
method for generating a complete linear order.
I don't require a linear order. I'm OK with a partial ordering.
I'm looking for a deterministic method for generating a "picture" (partial
ord
Hallo,
as long as the used tie-breaking strategy guarantees
that M1 is ranked ahead of M2, I see no problem.
See section 5 of my paper:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2011/10/28 Kevin Venzke
> Hi Jameson,
>
> I am a little short on time, to read this as carefully as I would like, but
> if you have a
> moment to answer in the meantime:
>
> --- En date de : *Ven 28.10.11, Jameson Quinn * a
> écrit :
>
> voting is best. But how do you deal with strategy? Figuring
2011/10/28 MIKE OSSIPOFF
>
> (Sorry to change the subject line, but this one is much easier to write.)
>
>
> Kevin wrote:
>
> Mike's method is Condorcet//MMPO//Condorcet//MMPO//etc.
>
> [unquote]
>
> No. I initially defined such a method. Then I said that I propose only
>
> MMPO (applied to its o
Hi Jameson,
I am a little short on time, to read this as carefully as I would like, but if
you have a
moment to answer in the meantime:
--- En date de : Ven 28.10.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
voting is best. But how do you deal with strategy? Figuring out what strategies
are sensible is the re
(Sorry to change the subject line, but this one is much easier to write.)
Kevin wrote:
Mike's method is Condorcet//MMPO//Condorcet//MMPO//etc.
[unquote]
No. I initially defined such a method. Then I said that I propose only
MMPO (applied to its own ties), because FBC is more important than C
Jameson Quinn wrote:
As you might have guessed, I'm arguing here for method 3. Kevin Venzke
has done work in this direction, but his assumptions --- that voters
will look for first-order strategies in an environment of highly
volatile polling data --- while very useful for making a computable
On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 2:43 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> What makes a single-winner election method good? The primary consideration
> is that it gives good results. The clearest way to measure the quality of
> results is simulated voter utility, otherwise known as Bayesian Regret (BR).
>
> This is
What makes a single-winner election method good? The primary consideration
is that it gives good results. The clearest way to measure the quality of
results is simulated voter utility, otherwise known as Bayesian Regret (BR).
This is not the only consideration. But for this message, we'll discount
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