I agree it's silly to create complicated rules for a two-slot ballot. But,
though Forest didn't quite say so, I also think that FBC and (voted ballot)
Condorcet are not incompatible for a 3-slot ballot.
Jameson
2011/11/22 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Forest,
When the range ballots
I tried to vote by registering and then returning on a later day to
vote and was unable to find any link to the vote page without going
through the register page, which I had already done. Thus, I did not
vote.
--
Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
One of the
-- Forwarded message --
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 11:53:06 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 11/22/2011 9:38 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: So how about it? Can we try
Jameson:
I'd said:
Condorcet's Criterion:
If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone
votes sincerely,
then x should win.
You replied:
My point is that this is equivalent to:
If
the ballots are such that it could be the case that, for every y not x,
2011/11/22 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
Jameson:
I'd said:
Condorcet's Criterion:
If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and
everyone votes sincerely,
then x should win.
You replied:
My point is that this is equivalent to:
If
the ballots are such
dlw: All analysis shows that the perceived problems with IRV are seriously
attenuated with only 3 candidates.
The primary anti-IRV example people use is Burlington, with only 3 major
candidates.
Jameson
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