Dear Ross Hyman,
you wrote (28 Nov 2011):
> One way of retaining monotonicity, I think, is to replace
> the Sets with objects that record the number of times that
> a A has beaten B.
Suppose A-C-B is the strongest path from candidate A to
candidate B. Suppose B-A is the strongest path from cand
What would be the simplest paper count that will produce a winner in the
smith set?
I was thinking of just collecting the first preference totals for all
candidates, and comparing the top two candidates on a two candidate
preferred basis (by examining other ballots). Transfers the votes of the
los
Condorcet is easy for voters to move to for it is a strong, but
simple, step up from FPTP and:
1. Ranking means ability indicate order of varying desires of liking
candidates.
2. But ranking is much less of a task than Score's rating where you
have to calculate the difference in value of A
Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011):
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
>
>To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing
>any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler and cheaper to do than
>IRV.
>
If we are talking about the classi
Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011):
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing
any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler and cheaper to do than
IRV.
If we are talking about the classic versio
Candidates are classed in two categories: Winners and Losers. Initially, all
candidates are Winners. C_i is the ith candidate. A matrix M contains how
many times candidates have defeated each other. The element M_ij equals the
number of times that C_i defeats C_j. Initially M is the Identit
But is that the only monotonic clone independent method? The method I describe
elects D instead of A in accordance with D>A. But I don't see why it would
violate clone independence.
Consider the matrix in which the elements are the number of times the column
candidate has defeated the row c
Forrest--
Thanks for the comments about MMPO2.
Though some object to Kevin's MMPO bad-example, I've answered that objection.
I want to hear the specification of that new method you mentioned before
Thanksgiving Day.
In RV, I don't know if the factions could trust eachother.
Thanks again for
Kristofer:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> If one is going to propose a method involving proxies, then Proxy DD is the
> biggest and most
> ambitious improvment. I described it in a posting when you asked about it.
>
> Though it's a much more ambitious thing to ask for, maybe people _would_ want
> a
MMT:
MMT can be made to meet FBC by replacing "...over all candidates outside that
set" with
"at top or over all candidates outside that set".
But it still isn't ideal, because it makes all middle ratings strongly
conditional, preventing middle
support for a lesser-evil who is genuinely a midd
Hallo,
in section 5 stage 3 of my paper, I explain how
Tideman's ranked pairs method can be used (without
having to sacrifice monotonicity, independence of
clones, reversal symmetry, or any other important
criterion) to resolve situations where the Schulze
winner is not unique:
http://m-schulze.
On 23 Nov 2011 17:51:45 -0800, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> MMCWPO is the method that elects the candidate whose maximal
> weighted pairwise opposition is minimal. It solves the ABE problem
> as well as the FBC.
To clarify, MMCWPO is MinMax (MMPO) combined with James
Green-Armytage's Cardinal Weighte
How so?
--
Dear Ross Hyman,
you wrote (28 Nov 2011):
> One way of retaining monotonicity, I think, is to replace
> the Sets with objects that record the number of times that
> a A has beaten B.
I guess that this tie-breaking strategy will violate
independence of clones.
Markus Schulze
On Mon, Nov 28, 2011 at 4:47 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2011/11/27 David L Wetzell
>
>> meh,
>> I don't want to take bet number 1.
>>
>
> Understood. Please notice what you're saying here: you think you are
> unlikely in practice (less than 17%, if you were a rational
> money-maximizer) to co
Dear Ross Hyman,
you wrote (28 Nov 2011):
> One way of retaining monotonicity, I think, is to replace
> the Sets with objects that record the number of times that
> a A has beaten B.
I guess that this tie-breaking strategy will violate
independence of clones.
Markus Schulze
Election-Meth
Markus is right.
One way of retaining monotonicity, I think, is to replace the Sets with objects
that record the number of times that a A has beaten B.
Then for the pair ordering
A>C, B>C
C>D
D>A, D>B, A>B
Affirming A>C and B> C
A(W):A(W)
B(W):B(W)
C(L):A(W),B(W),C(L)
D(W):D(W)
Affirming C>D
2011/11/27 David L Wetzell
> meh,
> I don't want to take bet number 1.
>
Understood. Please notice what you're saying here: you think you are
unlikely in practice (less than 17%, if you were a rational
money-maximizer) to convince people on this list to line up behind IRV. I
obviously agree with
If we are talking about natural measures of defeat strength, then I must say
that margins and ratio seem reasonably sensible to me, and winning votes does
not. It is hard to justify the idea that defeat 49-48 is as strong as 49-0, and
defeat 49-48 is stronger than 48-0. It is also weird that if
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
because *both* the winning votes is tied and the margins is tied. what
else is there?
i wonder if it would be better to first rank each pair according to
Margins and then, in the case of tie of Margins, Winning Votes are used
to break the tie to determine which
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