[EM] Chris: MMT criterion compliances.

Mike, ...now it's a matter of whether MMT2 meets FBC and Mono-Add-Plump. MMT2 definition: A "mutual majority" candidate set is a set of candidates who are each rated above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters-- where that set includes at least one top-rated candidate on

Re: [EM] Chris: MMT criterion compliances.

2011/12/7 MIKE OSSIPOFF > > Chris: > > You wrote: > > I think this fails the FBC. > > [endquote] > > But you're specifically referring to what I now call "MMT1", which > isn't my main MMT proposal now. Sorry that I've kept changing my > MMT definitions--I know that's a nuisance--but now it's a ma

[EM] Dave Ketchum: IRV strategy

Dave: On Dec 6, 2011, at 4:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > > > How to vote in IRV: > > > > When there are completely unacceptable candidates who might > win (I call that condition u/a, for “unacceptable/acceptable”) You replied: You DO NOT rank such since, if you rank such a candidate, so might

[EM] How to vote in IRV

Chris: You wrote: Similar to the good Approval strategy "approve the candidate A you would vote for in FPP, plus all the candidates you like as much or better than A" as an IRV strategy guide is "vote in first place the candidate A you would vote for in FPP and in second place the candidate B

[EM] Chris: MMT criterion compliances.

Chris: You wrote: I think this fails the FBC. [endquote] But you're specifically referring to what I now call "MMT1", which isn't my main MMT proposal now. Sorry that I've kept changing my MMT definitions--I know that's a nuisance--but now it's a matter of whether MMT2 meets FBC and Mono-Add

[EM] That was MMT1. MMT2 is like MTAOC. Replacing the word "any" in the definitions.

MMT1: I'm not changing the definition of MMT that I posted last night. I'll call it "MMT1". It's even more demanding in its reciprocity requirements than was the original (one-paragraph-definition) MTAOC. It was that over-demandingness that led me to propose my pseudocode-defined MTAOC. MMT2:

[EM] How to vote in IRV

Mike, Similar to the good Approval strategy "approve the candidate A you would vote for in FPP, plus all the candidates you like as much or better than A" as an IRV strategy guide is "vote in first place the candidate A you would vote for in FPP and in second place the candidate B that you wou

[EM] Complete MMT definition

Mike, I think this fails the FBC. Say sincere is: 45: C 06: D>A 39: A>B 20: B>A There is no "mutual majority set" (by your latest definition) so C wins. That is also true if the 6 D>A voters change to D=A or D=A=B or D=A>B or anything else except A>B or A=B or B>A in which case the winner c