2011/12/15 Andrew Myers an...@cs.cornell.edu
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have
reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to
delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just
One kind of SODA strategy which I didn't discuss is candidate
preference-declaration strategy aimed, not at directly attaining a better
result, but at attracting votes. This would basically take two forms:
established candidates truncating upstarts to try to minimize their
importance, and a
Here's a simple strategy rule of thumb. I don't claim it's perfect strategy
in all cases, but it is in all the cases I've checked.
When it is your turn to assign delegated votes, find the current Smith
set (that is, counting all unassigned delegated ballots, including the
ones delegated to you,
Chris:
You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump:
I've already commented on that a few times.
You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion:
But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC.
You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:
I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to
Chris:
You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump:
I've already commented on that a few times.
You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion:
But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC.
You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:
I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to
Chris:
You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump:
I've already commented on that a few times.
You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion:
But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC.
You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:
I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any
On 12/15/2011 12:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
dlw: Within the third parties themselves, there'd need to be used
single-winner elections to determine their candidates/leaders/positions.
In these regards, there'd be great scope for experimentation with
single-winner election rules,
When I tried to post the message that I just posted, I received
a notification that it couldn't be sent because the server was busy, and
that I should re-send.
Maybe next time, then, I should wait a while before re-sending.
Mike Ossipoff
If voters think that SODA is complex, then it's because they have been exposed
unnecessarily or
prematurely to the niceties of strategy considerations.
Let's take a lesson from IRV supporters. They don't get anybody worried about
IRV's monotonicity
failure or FBC failure by bringing them up
-- Forwarded message --
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2011 12:39:23 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] Electoral Experimentation
On 12/15/2011 12:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
dlw: Within the third parties
2011/12/15 fsimm...@pcc.edu
If voters think that SODA is complex, then it's because they have been
exposed unnecessarily or
prematurely to the niceties of strategy considerations.
Let's take a lesson from IRV supporters. They don't get anybody worried
about IRV's monotonicity
failure or
Mike,
I think your example applies to all acquiescing coalition methods that we have
considered. The failure is
caused by someone leap frogging over others to get to the top position.
But I think that most of these methods satisfy this FBC like property:
If the winner changes when (on some
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