Re: [EM] Gaming the Vote

2012-01-30 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
On 01/31/2012 01:48 AM, Ted Stern wrote: I've been thinking that one way to spread information about alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems. [...] Has anyone out there in the EM communities thought about this? I saw someone made a game out of gerrymandering. Did i

Re: [EM] Majority Judgement

2012-01-30 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
On 01/30/2012 10:09 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable candidates who could win? How about in an e

Re: [EM] Sortition and the Delegable Proxy system

2012-01-30 Thread Clinton Mead
Why not simply IRV until 500 candidates are left. Wouldn't this produce a similar result without the randomness? Elected candidates would have votes equal to the number of votes they had at the end of the above procedure. On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 5:05 PM, Bryan Mills wrote: > On Wed, Jan 25, 20

Re: [EM] Sortition and the Delegable Proxy system

2012-01-30 Thread Bryan Mills
On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 01/24/2012 07:28 AM, Bryan Mills wrote: >> >> I've been looking at a voting system over the past week or so that I >> think is really interesting: a combination of the "delegable proxy" >> system with a sortition procedure to ele

Re: [EM] Gaming the Vote

2012-01-30 Thread robert bristow-johnson
On 1/30/12 7:48 PM, Ted Stern wrote: I've been thinking that one way to spread information about alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems. Wikipedia explains gamification better than I could: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamification wow, that says something beca

[EM] Gaming the Vote

2012-01-30 Thread Ted Stern
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems. Wikipedia explains gamification better than I could: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamification Basically, it's a form of crowd-sourcing where you give game-like point

[EM] Contextuality determines relative import of criterion.

2012-01-30 Thread David L Wetzell
I think it depends on what sort of election, what sort of political environment. Nonmonotonicity is low priority if the probability of it mattering is low, because it's not likely enuf to matter for voter-strategy formation. Thus, with IRV+, in the relatively rare case of a competitive three way

Re: [EM] Kevin: Majority Judgement

2012-01-30 Thread Jameson Quinn
2012/1/30 MIKE OSSIPOFF > > Hi Kevin-- > > You wrote: > > In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy > patterns to Approval. (Though so > does Range.) > > [endquote] > > Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it > doesn't get get

Re: [EM] Majority Judgement

2012-01-30 Thread Jameson Quinn
MJ strategy is: >From polls and past elections, estimate the range of possible median scores of whoever wins this election. For instance, if you can vote A+, A, B, C, D, or F, then you might estimate that the winner will be between B+ and C-. Then, vote anyone you want to win above this range, any

[EM] Kevin: Majority Judgement

2012-01-30 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Hi Kevin-- You wrote: In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy patterns to Approval. (Though so does Range.) [endquote] Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it doesn't get get rid of strategies possessed by much simpler m

[EM] Re : Majority Judgement

2012-01-30 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Mike,   In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy patterns to Approval. (Though so does Range.)   If there are three candidates, you can rank them A>B>C and get protection for A from the B preference if you believe that A's viability depends on A having a top-

[EM] AERLO probably spoils FBC compliance.

2012-01-30 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
It probably does that with any method. Suppose it's Nader, some Democrats, and some Republicans. You equal-top-rank Nader and all the Democrats. Nader wins. If you and others like you had left Nader out, a Democrat would have won. The Republicans have ranked all the Republicans and Democrats

[EM] Majority Judgement

2012-01-30 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable candidates who could win? How about in an election without completely unacceptable can

[EM] Which matters more: Getting/Figuring Out the Best Single-Winner Rule or Incorporating More Multi-Winner Rules ASAP in the US?

2012-01-30 Thread David L Wetzell
is the relevant question and nested within it is whether or not the US's two-party dominated system can be saved without pushing for a more EU-style multi-party system. Cuz, even if X_EU >> X_2partystatusquo that does not mean X_EU*p_EU> X_2partyplus*P_2partyplus, whereas X_2partyplus is at least >

Re: [EM] Propose plain Approval first. Option enhancements can be later proposals.

2012-01-30 Thread Juho Laatu
On 30.1.2012, at 8.46, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > We know that if some method X passes all criteria Y does and then some, we > can suppose that X is better than Y. I don't think criteria are black and white in that sense. It is quite possible that a method that meets all but one of the "im