On 01/31/2012 01:48 AM, Ted Stern wrote:
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about
alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems.
[...]
Has anyone out there in the EM communities thought about this?
I saw someone made a game out of gerrymandering. Did i
On 01/30/2012 10:09 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what
valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s
utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable
candidates who could win? How about in an e
Why not simply IRV until 500 candidates are left.
Wouldn't this produce a similar result without the randomness?
Elected candidates would have votes equal to the number of votes they had
at the end of the above procedure.
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 5:05 PM, Bryan Mills wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 20
On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> On 01/24/2012 07:28 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:
>>
>> I've been looking at a voting system over the past week or so that I
>> think is really interesting: a combination of the "delegable proxy"
>> system with a sortition procedure to ele
On 1/30/12 7:48 PM, Ted Stern wrote:
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about
alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems.
Wikipedia explains gamification better than I could:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamification
wow, that says something beca
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about
alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems.
Wikipedia explains gamification better than I could:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamification
Basically, it's a form of crowd-sourcing where you give game-like
point
I think it depends on what sort of election, what sort of political
environment.
Nonmonotonicity is low priority if the probability of it mattering is low,
because it's not likely enuf to matter for voter-strategy formation. Thus,
with IRV+, in the relatively rare case of a competitive three way
2012/1/30 MIKE OSSIPOFF
>
> Hi Kevin--
>
> You wrote:
>
> In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy
> patterns to Approval. (Though so
> does Range.)
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it
> doesn't get get
MJ strategy is:
>From polls and past elections, estimate the range of possible median scores
of whoever wins this election. For instance, if you can vote A+, A, B, C,
D, or F, then you might estimate that the winner will be between B+ and C-.
Then, vote anyone you want to win above this range, any
Hi Kevin--
You wrote:
In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy
patterns to Approval. (Though so
does Range.)
[endquote]
Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it
doesn't get get rid of strategies
possessed by much simpler m
Hi Mike,
In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy
patterns to Approval. (Though so
does Range.)
If there are three candidates, you can rank them A>B>C and get protection for A
from the B preference if you
believe that A's viability depends on A having a top-
It probably does that with any method.
Suppose it's Nader, some Democrats, and some Republicans.
You equal-top-rank Nader and all the Democrats.
Nader wins. If you and others like you had left Nader out, a Democrat would
have won.
The Republicans have ranked all the Republicans and Democrats
Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what valid
strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s utility in an
election with acceptable and completely unacceptable candidates who could win?
How about in an election without completely unacceptable can
is the relevant question and nested within it is whether or not the US's
two-party dominated system can be saved without pushing for a more EU-style
multi-party system.
Cuz, even if X_EU >> X_2partystatusquo that does not mean X_EU*p_EU>
X_2partyplus*P_2partyplus, whereas X_2partyplus is at least >
On 30.1.2012, at 8.46, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> We know that if some method X passes all criteria Y does and then some, we
> can suppose that X is better than Y.
I don't think criteria are black and white in that sense. It is quite possible
that a method that meets all but one of the "im
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