Hi Mike,
De : Jameson Quinn
>À : MIKE OSSIPOFF
>Cc : election-meth...@electorama.com
>Envoyé le : Mardi 28 février 2012 15h29
>Objet : Re: [EM] C/D is persistent. Another Approval C/D mitigation. IRV and
>sincerity.
>
>
>(Though I'd still really appreciate it if you made quick electowiki pag
First off, I heartily agree that the cooperation/defection problem (aka
ABE, aka Chicken Dilemma) is probably the most broadly-applicable,
hard-to-solve problem in voting theory. The reason is simple: if there's a
majority condorcet winner, it's easy to make a system which has a
unique-winner stron
C/D:
It seems to me that the co-operation/defection (C/D) problem is more difficult
to truly eliminate
than I'd believed. Hugely reducible, but maybe not eliminatable.
The methods that I've been suggesting, to get rid of the C/D problem--I'll
refer to those as
"defection-resistant" methods. T
