Re: [EM] u/a for criteria. u/a FBC. Voter's Choice. SSCS. Strong FBC.

2012-05-18 Thread Michael Ossipoff
Kristofer: On 05/11/2012 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > Of course the way to define u/a for criteria would be in terms of votes. > A definition of u/a for criteria: > In a critrerion failure-example, an election is u/a for some > particular voter V iff: > The candidates can be divided i

Re: [EM] To Condorcetists:

2012-05-18 Thread Michael Ossipoff
Juho: Would the governments be minority governments or coalition governments? [endquote] They'd be popular governments. If it consisted of only one party, I don't know if it would be the favorite of more than half of the voters. My guess is that it usually will. But yes, there could be several

Re: [EM] To Condorcetists:

2012-05-18 Thread Dave Ketchum
This started as a thread to talk a bit about Condorcet. That has faded away, and all I see is trivia about Plurality vs Approval - too trivial a difference between them to support enough thoughts to be worth writing this much, even less for reading. DWK On May 18, 2012, at 9:56 PM, Michael

Re: [EM] To Condorcetists:

2012-05-18 Thread Michael Ossipoff
> How could using Approval instead of Plurality in our single-member > districts be bad? I've talked about how Approval's results would > differ from those of Plurality. Proportional representation and two-party systems are two well known approaches. Approval with single winner districts is a ne

Re: [EM] u/a for criteria. u/a FBC. Voter's Choice. SSCS. Strong FBC.

2012-05-18 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
On 05/11/2012 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: Of course the way to define u/a for criteria would be in terms of votes. A definition of u/a for criteria: In a critrerion failure-example, an election is u/a for some particular voter V iff: The candidates can be divided into two sets, A and