Juho:
Here's the MinMax(margins) chicken dilemma example that I promised, in
which defection by B voters is successful and rewarded::
Sincere preferences:
75: ABC
51: BAC
100: C(A=B)
Voted rankings:
75: AB
51: B
100: C
Try MinMax(margins) with that example.
Note that it's a Dodgson example
On 25.9.2012, at 7.56, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
Minmax(margins) can elect outside the top cycle if such a candidate is
closest to being a CW (measured in number of required additional
votes)
[endquote]
Now, you see, that's exactly what I was talking about. Now you're
back
Having multiple nonpartisan executive officers in each regime to watch each
other *may* reduce the corruption a bit.
i.e. multiple sheriffs and public attorneys especially.
The U.S.A. regime with only the Prez/VP being elected in the Fed executive
branch via the timebomb minority rule
On 25.9.2012, at 9.31, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
Here's the MinMax(margins) chicken dilemma example that I promised, in
which defection by B voters is successful and rewarded::
Sincere preferences:
75: ABC
51: BAC
100: C(A=B)
Voted rankings:
75: AB
51: B
100: C
Try
Another gerrymander case by SCOTUS --
play robot party hack games with district lines.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx
R-78 Tennant v. Jefferson County, 567 U.S. (2012).
The gerrymander incumbent monarchs will LOVE the protect the incumbents
stuff in the JUNK
