What about this rule, if simplicity is required.
1) Run a standard PR-STV election.
2) If the result violates the criterion
- permanently eliminate the weakest candidate of the over-represented
gender and repeat
The first candidate to be eliminated is weakest and the first
candidate to be
I recently asked someone about the practical value of the Smith Criterion.
IRV dramatizes the desirability of choosing the CW. Presumably there could
be situations in which not choosing from the Smith set could cause a
problem similar to one caused by not choosing the CW.
I've suggested some
IC-Smith//Plurality might be better named IC-Smith//Top, because Plurality
doesn't allow voting more than one candidate at top.
IC-Smith//Top:
Using the IC definition of beat, determine the Smith set. Elect the
Smith-set member who is voted at top on the most ballots.
[end of IC-Smith//Top
On 02/12/2013 12:24 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing CAB to ABC causes B to lose (or
variants of this kind of problem). That's
On 02/12/2013 01:42 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/11/2013 2:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should
say it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech
On 02/12/2013 04:59 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/12/2013 12:24 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing CAB to ABC causes B
Earlier, I couldn't find any reason why IC-Smith//Top wouldn't meet
FBC, but I don't suppose that Smith is compatible with FBC.
I could be mistaken, but it seems to me that Smith implies MMC.
Since it IC-Smith//Top doesn't meet FBC, then there'd be little reason
to use it instead of