Consider the following scenario in SODA:
1: A(CBD)
2: B,X
2: C(BAD)
1: D(ACB)
1: null
Presume all ties are predictably broken for the alphabetically-first
candidate (without this presumption, you'd need larger numbers, but you
could still make a similar scenario). Under SODA with rational
On 4/19/2013 11:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
...
So, what do people think? Should I change the default definition of SODA
to make it have better compliances? Or should I keep it the way it is
because the change would never matter in practical terms and would only
make the system sound more
Methods that choose between top 2 Approval, top 2 Plurality, Top 2 Bucklin,
etc. have problems that we are all familiar with, in particular clones mess
them up.
But what if our method elects the pairwise preference between
the method A winner and the method B winner? If the two winners are the
Maybe this should be published. If the party system isn't about to
fall apart - if the argument can be refuted or undermined - then we
want to know that in advance. An academic paper plus a Web teaser
would probably force the issue one way or another; either prove us
wrong on paper, or give us
Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could
choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and
then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice between
the two method winners.
We would learn something about the popularity of the
