[EM] NY state "fair elections" public funding bill (comments asap please?)

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Re: [EM] In political elections C (in terms of serious candidates w. an a priori strong chance of election) will never get large!

On 5/27/2013 12:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: ... The short-comings of IRV depend on the likely number of serious candidates whose a priori odds of winning, before one assigns voter-utilities, are strong. If real life important single-winner political elections have economies of scale in running

Re: [EM] [CES #8441] "true expressivities" of voting methods

At 11:53 AM 5/27/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: Interesting, that you can usually calculate the median using 1.5 bits per grade. That would seem to indicate that a 3-level Bucklin system such as MCA uses approximately all the info on the ballot. As to Bucklin, historically, it usually did. I recal

[EM] A Table to look at small C props of Change in Expressivity for Change in C.

Smith > > > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "The Center for Election Science" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving

[EM] Does IRV pass strategic condorcet?

If there is a majority Condorcet winner, any voting system that passes the majority criterion will elect that candidate in a unique strong Nash equilibrium. But the standard version of chicken dilemma involves a non-majority Condorcet winner: 40: X 35: Y>Z 25: Z>Y Y is the CW, but the victory over

[EM] In political elections C (in terms of serious candidates w. an a priori strong chance of election) will never get large!

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Re: [EM] "true expressivities" of voting methods

On 5/27/2013 8:52 AM, Warren D Smith wrote: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html Interesting. Plurality and Approval collect so much less information that they do not noticeably ignore any information. Instant-runoff voting obviously ignores information because it only considers pre

Re: [EM] [CES #8439] "true expressivities" of voting methods

Interesting, that you can usually calculate the median using 1.5 bits per grade. That would seem to indicate that a 3-level Bucklin system such as MCA uses approximately all the info on the ballot. I've also noticed before that 3-level ballots have another interesting property: the differences betw

[EM] "true expressivities" of voting methods

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