- prohibit surplus transfers among different parties.
- adoption of STV in the future.
Do you agree with these measures?
_______
Diego Renato dos Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
As a newbie in this list, I have no preference about the best voting method.
I am aware that instinctively Condorcet criterion is desirable if consensus
does not exist, but approval or range can produce good results too.
However, based in Bucklin experiences in USA, I think that any method that
vi
naturally the first
preference. In Brazil, if ties persist, the oldest candidate wins.
>From: "Diego Renato" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >To: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >CC: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> >Subject: Re: [Electio
2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking
>
> And I dislike methods that give all power to only one half of the voters
> and can be used to oppress 49% of the electorate :-)
>
In most societies, the "majority dictatorship"
2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Dear Rob!
>
> It is possible (otherwise I would not have posted this challenge :-)
>
> But of course it is not possible with a majoritarian method (that's what
> you observed).
>
> Keep on, one of the possible solutions is really simple (though
2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.
>
> The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
>
> The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
>
> A concrete example: true ratings are
>55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
>45 voters: B 100,
2007/8/18, Gervase Lam:
>
> > [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your
> compromise
> > candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your
> votes
> > for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the
> > second round.
>
> The ideal way to s
Correction:
> 2nd count (1st round):
> 22,5 Bush clone
> 27 Gore <- selected for runoff.
> 26 Nader
>
>
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2007/8/16, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax:
> At 04:00 PM 8/15/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
> >All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are
> >vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality
> voting.
>
> "Vulnerable" implies that there i
2007/8/15, Dave Ketchum:
>
> On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single
> candidate. Why is this something to fight?
> One candidate can overshadow the competition.
> Voters can be loyal to their party.
For occasional exception elections there will be mor
All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are vulnerable to
bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting. For instance,
suppose that some voter has A as his/her first preference. S/he can vote
like this:
Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected
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