OK, then could we call it the First-level-strategic Approval Winner set
or the 1SAW set for short? I suspect better names are possible, but I can't
think of one.
As an aside: I think exploring good ranked methods like this is worthwhile
from a theoretical point of view. But from a practical
The Simmons set?
2013/10/12 Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu
Kevin,
In the first step of the variant method MMPO[IA = MPO] (which, as the
name suggests, elects the MMPO candidate from among those having at least
as much Implicit Approval as Max Pairwise Opposition) all candidates with
Abd's advice was good but luckily unnecessary. I made it to 20 pledges,
which includes over 15 new members. Details later.
2013/8/25 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 12:58 PM 8/25/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
In the next 2 hours, if I don't get at least 3 people to pledge $5
/Matching-experiment-10x-your-impact-or-Ill-give-you-5-free
but
here are the basic details:
- You can make one or more pledges by messaging me (Jameson
Quinnhttp://www.quora.com/Jameson-Quinn).
(email also works)
- If in 1 week (before noon PST on August 25th), I get 20 pledges in
total, each
An idiosyncratic 4-D chart of voting system quality by Jameson Quinn on
Game Theory, Politics, and
Metahttp://metapolitics.quora.com/An-idiosyncratic-4-D-chart-of-voting-system-quality
In general, while I'm happy to reply to comments on this material here, I'd
prefer have the conversation via
2013/7/26 Clay Shentrup c...@electology.org
On Friday, July 26, 2013 7:47:41 AM UTC-7, Bruce R. Gilson wrote:
To me, voter satisfaction also includes some other elements: especially,
as we've debated, the question of could I have done better by voting
differently? And of course, Approval, as
2013/7/26 Peter Gustafsson mining...@hotmail.com
from: jameson.qu...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 12:54:09 -0600
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com;
electionscie...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [EM] Top 2+1 Approval primaries
Here's a simple proposal for a top-two-like mechanism for
Here's a simple proposal for a top-two-like mechanism for primaries, copied
from an answer of mine on
Quorahttp://www.quora.com/Politics-of-the-U-S/How-would-you-redesign-the-top-two-primary-system/answer/Jameson-Quinn
:
The simplest good solution would be *Top 2+1 approval
An interesting article from DLW on modelling two-party voting as a battle
between two networks. (The comments are depressingly stupid, though.)
-- Forwarded message --
From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
Date: 2013/7/22
Subject: The list might like this...
To: Jameson Quinn
I have kept up with this thread only intermittently. It seems to have
strayed significantly far away from its subject line, and while I've been
interested in some of the points that have been made, it's hard to
summarize the thread as a whole.
There is one point I've wanted to make, which seems a
IMC seems to me to be too narrow to be a general criterion, if only one
custom-built voting system passes it. WIMC is an interesting refinement of
Condorcet and Smith. But neither belongs on Wikipedia without a reliable
citation.
Jameson
2013/7/5 sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu
FairVote wrote
http://www.quora.com/Egyptian-Military-Ousts-Mohamed-Morsi-July-3-2013/What-were-the-primary-reasons-that-the-Egyptian-military-removed-Morsi-from-the-Presidency/answer/Jameson-Quinn
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
OK. I think we can work this out. Before I make more arguments, I'm going
to try to explain the disagreements as I see them, and ask you more about
what you're saying.
A. MAV vs. ER-Bucklin (ERB, though we should probably find a better name at
some point). That is, completion using above-median,
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections_2013/Post_mortem
I think it would be worthwhile to bring some expertise to the section at
the end. But let's keep it on-topic and try to keep from getting too deep
into the election theory weeds.
Jameson
Election-Methods mailing
in real life it
could easily be that, say, CL and R dominate in first-choice support.
Jameson
2013/7/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 11:38 AM 7/4/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
OK. I think we can work this out. Before I make more arguments, I'm going
to try to explain
2013/7/3 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 12:31 AM 7/3/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Abd, I noticed something. I don't want to jump to any conclusions, so I'm
asking you directly.
2013/7/3 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.coma**
b...@lomaxdesign.com a...@lomaxdesign.com
Kristofer nailed it as usual, I have only one small point to add:
Let’s assume that we have a magical gift – a super power, if you will.
We can know exactly what each voter thinks about each candidate. Now,
because this comes from magic, it cannot unfortunately be used as a part
of the
Abd, I noticed something. I don't want to jump to any conclusions, so I'm
asking you directly.
2013/7/3 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
... Bucklin ...
You said Bucklin, not EMAV. So, two questions and a comment:
Q1. Why did you change?
Q2. Is there anything that would convince
Benjamin:
You are right to point out that we should have some discussion of basic
principles to underly our discussion of specific systems. Here are my own
views:
1. There is no single easy philosophical answer to these questions. There
will always be those who, like Clay, would rather grab the
I responded with a new subject header because I was still hoping that Abd
would respond to my earlier post, copied below:
Abd:
Frankly, I'm a bit frustrated. One of the main reasons I proposed MAV in
the first place was that you seemed to support it. You've done a good job
expressing the
2013/6/30 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
I've argued I have argued
My next arg
I then have argued
This is a long chain of reasoning. Each link may seem solid to you, but
even if you are 80% right at each of four steps, by the end of the chain
you're only 40% right.
It seems to me that we're not connecting on several levels.
Most importantly, on consensus process. I've participated in consensus
decisions in real life, and it seems to me that there are at least two
different ways they can break down. You are right that one of the ways is
for a majority to
Abd proposed Bucklin//Score, which he dubbed evaluative majority approval
voting. My first, and still my principal, response was: that's not bad,
and if you can build were a consensus behind that, I'll sign on. I'd still
like to see Abd respond to that ( and ideally commit to first mentioning a
Another option is to introduce weights on each party for a given region.
Say that the Northern Norway region has 6 leveling seats. Then you
calculate the desired outcome for the NN region as a whole (using
Sainte-Laguë) and compare this to the current outcome (by adding up all the
county
, so I'm consciously deciding to be more
forceful here. I hope you realize that I would not be doing this if I
didn't truly respect your intelligence and insight.
Jameson
2013/6/28 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 06:10 PM 6/27/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
And I like to talk about
this bar.
That is, center-squeeze is one of my main problems with IRV, along with its
problems with summability/fraud-poofing.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (27 June 2013):
2013/6/27 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Jameson,
I don't see it...
Say on an ABCD grading ballot you give
2013/6/26 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Jameson,
I don't like this version at all. These methods all have the problem that
the voters have a strong incentive to just submit approval ballots, i.e.
only use the top and bottom grades.
You are right... if they believe that all other voters
2013/6/27 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au
Jameson,
I don't see it...
Say on an ABCD grading ballot you give your Lesser Evil X a B, and then in
the second round both X and your Greater Evil Y reach the majority
threshold. In that case you obviously might have cause to regret that you
I've arrived at my destination, so I'll try to process through this thread.
It's substantial, so I'll probably have several comments to make. I'll
start with a quick response to Kristofer.
... So, for rated methods, I suggest Majority Judgement.
I absolutely agree that a median (aka Bucklin)
2013/6/25 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
On 06/25/2013 02:43 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I've arrived at my destination, so I'll try to process through this
thread. It's substantial, so I'll probably have several comments to
make. I'll start with a quick response to Kristofer
I also believe that there is too much emphasis being given to
combatting strategic voting. With the exception of lesser eviling,
which, I suppose, could be considered in this category, this is not
such a big problem, and certainly should not be used as an excuse for
supporting voting systems
Benn, Warren did cross a line with you, and you were entirely justified in
calling him on it. But on a list like this, with half a dozen people
actively participating in each thread, it is really hard to decide whether
to address people in the second or third person. I understand that after
the
.
** **
-Benn Grant
eFix Computer Consulting
b...@4efix.com
603.283.6601
** **
*From:* electionscie...@googlegroups.com [mailto:
electionscie...@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Jameson Quinn
*Sent:* Tuesday, June 25, 2013 6:46 PM
*To:* Benjamin Grant
*Cc:* electionscie
This is a good idea, but it would be even better if you used a better
voting system for the second round. In this case, approval or score would
be adequate, but MAV or MCA would be better. If I'm going to dream, then
SODA would be even better.
I know, David, that you value working hand-in-hand
Separately: I don't understand why you insist that D is an unapproved
grade. I have never treated it as anything but just another grade.
Obviously, any candidate who won with a D rating would have a very weak
mandate.
...It's a mess. Keep it simple.
Right. That means, no special separate
by Regenwetter) will allow good systems to
show near-optimal BR; so MAV and Score will be have nearly the same (and
nearly 0) honest BR, and the differences will be in that BR's robustness to
different strategic profiles.
Jameson
2013/6/18 Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
I've reworked
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
*From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Monday, June 17, 2013 3:14 PM
*Subject:* Re: Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can*
work together after all?
** **
Unfortunately, Bucklin systems fail that one too
New running tally, including Andy Jennings's latest votes (which went out
on only one of the lists). Current voting tallies in parentheses, ordered
JQ/AL/RB/AJ/DSH/BG/BRG. Options have been placed in descending order, which
I expect to be stable from here on.
Abd: please vote on MAV, MSV, CAV,
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Approval_Voting
Please help build up the article and work on the clearest consensus
wording. This article is all my own voice so far; my goal is for it not to
be.
Jameson
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I've reworked the description. See what you think.
2013/6/18 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 04:25 PM 6/18/2013, Juho Laatu wrote:
I quickly read the article. Here are some observations.
- Term Bucklin system has not been defined. I can guess that it
probably refers to Bucklin
2013/6/17 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
On 06/16/2013 06:55 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
With your kind indulgence, I would like some assistance in understanding
and hopefully mastering the various voting criteria, so that I can more
intelligently and accurately understanding the
Two points:
1.
I chatted with Rob Brown about the upper Bucklin naming question. His
votes were:
IRAV: F
DAT: B
Median Ranking: A
Median Rating: A
Median Grade: A
Cumulative Best Approval (CBA): B
I myself would give those latter four options C, C, B, and A respectively.
Here are my votes on
added 12 candidates there, but I'm sure with a little work I could
get it down to somewhere in the range of just 4-8 extra candidates. But the
point is made.
Jameson
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
** **
*From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Monday, June 17, 2013
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
A humorous (but utterly non-serious) thought just occurred to me:
** **
What voting method are you guys going to use to elect a name for this new
system?
The system itself, of course.
So what do you vote? It's fine if you leave out any vote
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
*From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Monday, June 17, 2013 1:25 PM
*Subject:* Re: Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can*
work together after all?
** **
So to make a ranked example:
** **
49
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
You just scared me, asking me how I vote, I don’t feel qualified to have
an opinion, I haven’t even focused on the conversation enough to know the
precise system you are talking about, so I was mostly just trying to stay
out of the way and let me elders
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
Is **this** an example of Bucklin failing Participation?
** **
5: ABC
4: BCA
** **
A wins
Right
** **
But add these in:
2: CAB
** **
B wins.
Yes, with your tiebreaker. Good job. But for other Bucklin
New running tally. Current voting tallies in parentheses, ordered
JQ/AL/RB/AJ/DSH/BG. Note the new option for Additive Approval Voting, which
could be a winner if Abd, Andy, and Ben like it enough. Current contenders
for best are in bold.
Instant Runoff Approval Voting: (B/A/F/C/F/F) Median C/F.
Unfortunately, Bucklin systems fail that one too.
However, it passes Adding one more ballot that votes X as highest
preference, and a ballot (either the same one or a second one) that votes Y
as lowest preference, should never change the winner from X to Y. You can
change highest to above the
I got votes from Bruce Gilson (BRG). New running tally. Current voting
tallies in parentheses, ordered JQ/AL/RB/AJ/DSH/BG/BRG.
Instant Runoff Approval Voting: (B/A/F/C/F/F/C) Median C.
Descending Approval Threshold Voting: (A/B-/B/C/C/F/A) Median B-; votes
above B, 2.
*Majority Approval
2013/6/17 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 01:23 PM 6/17/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant
mailto:b...@4efix.combenn@**4efix.comb...@4efix.com
Is *this* an example of Bucklin failing Participation?
5: ABC
4: BCA
A wins
Right
But add these in:
2
Computer Consulting
b...@4efix.com
603.283.6601
** **
*From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Sunday, June 16, 2013 11:20 AM
*To:* Kristofer Munsterhjelm
*Cc:* Benjamin Grant; election-methods@lists.electorama.com
*Subject:* Re: [EM] Absolutely new here
2013/6/16 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
...I would like to explain what I understand about some of these voting
criteria, a few at a time...
Thanks for doing this, and again, welcome.
*Name*: *Plurality*
*Description*: If A gets more “first preference” ballots than B, A must
not lose to
I have no idea what happened with your mailbox, but I got your message, and
indeed just sent a somewhat lengthy response.
Jameson
2013/6/16 Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
I submitted a post I was hoping for feedback on called “[EM] Voting
Criteria 101, Four Criteria” at around 1PM EST today.
I respect David's position and am happy to let him express it, but I would
like to point out one moment when he steers close to building a straw man
out of the rest of us:
2013/6/16 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
...we don't need to figure out the best single-winner election rule...
Those
2013/6/15 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
I also report that I was talking with a progressive activist (and former
legislator) here in Arizona last year who didn't like branding of the word
majority. He was afraid it would be a turn-off to those who feel like
the wrong majority is
2013/6/15 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 07:52 PM 6/14/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
So. Abd and I now agree that a Bucklin system which uses just the
above-median votes to break ties is probably the best first step towards
median voting.
Let's stop saying it that way.
I'd
So. Abd and I now agree that a Bucklin system which uses just the
above-median votes to break ties is probably the best first step towards
median voting. I'd like to get the details worked out, so we can stop using
different terms (Bucklin, MJ, GMJ) and settle on a single
clearly-defined proposal.
I just had a minor realization. As I said to Abd, his Bucklin-ER (as I
understand it) has slightly less resistance to the chicken dilemma than
GMJ, because the Bucklin-ER tiebreaker effectively ends up focusing
slightly below the median in the grade distribution, while GMJ focuses on a
region
As voting reform activists, we must work together as much as possible. In
general, that means that raising awareness should start with teaching
people about approval. Still, if someone is unsatisfied with the
expressivity of approval, we should have a backup offering.
Personally, I think that
I think we could have plenty of question captchas of the form:
- What letters are missing in E_ecto_ama (in order, no spaces)?
- What letters are missing in
Gibba_d-Satterth_aitehttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Gibbard-Satterthwaite_theorem
(in order, no spaces)?
etc. (Note the link in
2013/6/12 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
On 6/12/2013 7:55 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
... (As far as I know, MJ can only be expressed in one
way). ...
I wrote the following brief description of Majority Judgment. Is this
correct? If so, perhaps it's useful
2013/6/12 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 09:55 AM 6/12/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
As voting reform activists, we must work together as much as possible. In
general, that means that raising awareness should start with teaching
people about approval. Still, if someone
The electorama wiki is an important resource for communicating about new
methods. It allows linking to or searching for canonical definitions of the
methods we like to discuss here, and that many of us hope to promote for
real-world use. I just noticed that it has been set to not display pages
was talking about and
implied I was serious. Misunderstanding.
Cheers,
Jameson
2013/6/7 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 10:51 AM 6/7/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I'm sorry, I don't want to get into an interminable back and forth with
someone who misuses my name and doesn't apologize
2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
Another issue that was left a bit hanging in discussions on the CES list:
Does top-two Approval fail the Favorite Betrayal Criterion? There are
really two forms of top-two Approval to be considered, plus a third detail.
1. Top two approval
2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
Subject was: Re: [EM] Someone thinks that Approval should meet the Mutual
Majority Criterion
At 01:56 PM 6/6/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.coma**
b...@lomaxdesign.com a...@lomaxdesign.com
I don't think I've expressed my pivotal voter argument very well.
Warren's response clearly points to some holes in what I've *said*, but I
think my underlying argument is still firm.
So before responding point-by-point, let me try again to say what I'm
trying to get at.
Assume a chicken
I have argued before that median systems like
MJhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MJand
GMJ http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/GMJ are more resistant to chicken
dilemma pathologies than most other systems*. The various arguments I've
made all come from the same underlying dynamics, but they express the
If there is a majority Condorcet winner, any voting system that passes the
majority criterion will elect that candidate in a unique strong Nash
equilibrium. But the standard version of chicken dilemma involves a
non-majority Condorcet winner:
40: X
35: YZ
25: ZY
Y is the CW, but the victory over
What's with renaming later-no-harm as secret preferences? If you want to
make the argument that the name should be changed in general, this one
obscure web page seems to be a funny place to do so. Sometimes it's worth
just using the same words other people do.
2013/5/11 Warren D Smith
Forum question: Speaking of that awful voting method, is there a name for
the idea of each voter getting a specific number of points (such as 100 per
voter) and then distributing those points among the choices and then
assuming that the choices with the most points are the most popular?
PM 4/19/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Consider the following scenario in SODA:
1: A(CBD)
2: B,X
2: C(BAD)
1: D(ACB)
1: null
Presume all ties are predictably broken for the alphabetically-first
candidate (without this presumption, you'd need larger numbers, but you
could still make
Consider the following scenario in SODA:
1: A(CBD)
2: B,X
2: C(BAD)
1: D(ACB)
1: null
Presume all ties are predictably broken for the alphabetically-first
candidate (without this presumption, you'd need larger numbers, but you
could still make a similar scenario). Under SODA with rational
2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
2013/4/4 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
Not as I understood the description.
Right; you beat me to it.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hay voting seems to have been invented to encourage the expression of
sincere utilities, as distinct from von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and
there is a whole practically knee-jerk assumption in voting system theory
that strategy is bad.
You've made that assertion, that people are looking
By the way, I should have credited Warren smith for this realization:
However, there are crazy circumstances of incomplete information where
non-semi-honest strategies are rational, for all three kinds of methods.
As I said, I think it's not relevant to the real world, but it is quite
2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 01:54 PM 4/4/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Hay voting seems to have been invented to encourage the expression of
sincere utilities, as distinct from von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and
there is a whole practically knee-jerk assumption
2013/4/3 Forest Simmons fsimm...@pcc.edu
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 12:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 04/03/2013 12:01 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's consensus
thresholds for the various candidates.
If
2013/2/11 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
On 02/09/2013 09:41 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
2013/2/6 Richard
FobesElectionMethods@**votefair.orgelectionmeth...@votefair.org
:
How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
party-list positions?
On 2/6/2013 3:12
I think I've figured this out.
Use a quota of 2/11 for normal slots. The quota for quoted slots will be
somewhere between 3/22 and 2/11; thus the remainder will be between 1/11
and 2/11.
When you hit a quoted slot, first see who would win the remaining slots
under normal STV — call that set Ⓐ.
I think V should be 3/4 (if quoted-in) or 1 (if would have won that same
seat anyway). Thus, the quota would be 2/11, and the leftover
(unrepresented) quota at the end would be between 1/11 (Hare-like) and 2/11
(Droop-like).
Jameson
2013/2/7 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I try to address the
STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin
Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better
than STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is
clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply ignore
that
2013/2/6 Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com:
STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin
Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better
than
STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is
clear. When the quota makes
2013/1/27 Gervase Lam gervase@group.force9.co.uk
I was looking through the Approval Voting article and noticed that it
mentioned that in 2009 the Dartmouth Board of Trustees had Approval
successfully repealed.
It quotes an article in the web saying: When the alumni electorate
fails to
2013/1/18 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
On 01/17/2013 06:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Soon enough, just as has happened in Aspen (CO) and Burlington (VT), the
weaknesses of IRV counting will get exposed. In the meantime, just
getting people to talk about, and think about, the
2013/1/16 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok.
Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok.
Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will
happen through a third party gaining majority power. I believe that this
is, frankly, a pipe dream. Third
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok.
Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will
happen through a third party gaining majority
2013/1/10 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 6:48 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
wrote:
I suggest that you'll find that no non-probabilistic and
non-dictatorial method can meet Strong IIAC, as defined above.
I agree. However, they will break
OK, it seems that I have made one or more assertions which, if you believed
them, would change your mind about MJ. Of all the times you said unproven
assertion below, please tell me specifically which fall into each of the
following categories:
1. You believe they are likely to be true, but still
2013/1/9 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
Strong IIAC:
-
Premise:
An election is held. Everyone votes so as to maximize their utility
expectation, based on their utility-valuations of the candidates, and
their estimates or perceptions of any relevant probabilities
2013/1/7 Greg Nisbet gregory.nis...@gmail.com
Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods are
currently known that are reasonably good and don't require districts,
parties, or candidates that are capable of making decisions (I'm looking at
you, asset voting).
Like Abd,
Exactly. Your letter-grades encourage sub-optimal voting.
Zero-info optimal strategy is to vote on an absolute scale such that for
recent elections you would have given equal numbers of each grade A-D and
twice that number of Fs. (Or slightly more sophisticated: give the same
score distribution
I worked out a new, simpler way to explain CMJ based on a Bucklin-like
process. To accord better with this improved explanation, I'm renaming the
system to GMJ, or Graduated Majority Judgment. Here's the explanation:
===Ballot=== *The ballot will ask you to grade each candidate* on a scale
from A
In discussion with Michael Ossipoff, I realized that there's a better way
to state CMJ¹ than just stating the algebraic tiebreaker formula. So
here's the full definition of CMJ, using my new statement:
Each voter grades each candidate from A to F. Voters may give as many or
as few of each grade
Forsythe [1] conducted elections with a simple divided majority scenario,
using money to induce preferences. Faction sizes were 4,4, and 6; each
subject was in 3 successive groups and 8 elections in each group. There
were 96 elections for each of 3 methods: Plurality, Approval, and Borda.
(48
oops, there were a few mistakes in what I sent, because I hit send
prematurely:
They publish their data in a singularly useless format, but here's what I
see in the tables for approval:
without polls:
minority wins: 5/48
minority in 2-way tie: 7/48
minority in 3-way tie: 2/48
Total minority
Interesting. When is it different from the other formula?
Jameson
2012/12/13 Ross Hyman rahy...@sbcglobal.net
Here is a physics alternative to the effective number of parties
formulas mentioned on the Wikipedia page:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties
Based on the
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