I emphasize that these tentatively-defined stronger FBCs aren't really needed. The weaker FBC that I've been defining and using is enough to distinguish the seriously-failing methods. The methods that pass don't run afoul of Kristofer's question about "how simple the non-betrayal is". Still, it would be nice to specify that simple non-betrayal. That's the purpose of these tentative definition-attempts of Intermediate FBCs.
A tentative possible Intermediate FBC definition more similar to the Weak and Strong FBC definitions that I've just now posted. Intermediate FBC-2 A method meets Intermediate FBC-2 if it isn't posible to contrive a configuration of candidates, voters and ballots of all voters other than voter V, such that V can gain a result by voting someone over hir favorite, that is better in comparison to the results s/he could get by every one of the ways s/he could vote, subject only to the condition that she votes some other particular candidate(s), along with hir favorite, in 1st place, and votes some other particular set of candidates, and only them, at bottom. [end of Intermediate FBC-2 definition] Again, I can't guarantee that this works as intended. It's tentative. If it's what I intend, though, all of the methods that I call FBC methods meet it. Mike Ossipoff
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