On 9.6.2011, at 8.45, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
I think the coming paper in votingmatters on hybrid methods, shows
that strategy voting can be a problem in Condorcet methods (beatpath).
I would say that fears in a sense always are irrational, as they are
emotions. I think, that fears
On 7.6.2011, at 10.53, Peter Zbornik wrote:
I'd say that FBC (and LNH) is quite a big problem for Condorcet
methods, at least for someone (like me) who think sincere voting
should be the norm.
One could also claim that in typical political elections Condorcet methods will
work fine, and
Juho,
I think the coming paper in votingmatters on hybrid methods, shows
that strategy voting can be a problem in Condorcet methods (beatpath).
I would say that fears in a sense always are irrational, as they are
emotions. I think, that fears increase the chance of survival in many
cases though
Hi Kevin,
I agree, FBC is a problem for all Condorcet elections and generalized
symmetric completion does not help.
I think something should be written about the FBC on Wikipedia (but
with an other name as someone (Jonathan Lundell?) proposed on this
list, in order to avoid emotional connotations
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kevin,
I agree, FBC is a problem for all Condorcet elections and generalized
symmetric completion does not help.
I think something should be written about the FBC on Wikipedia (but
with an other name as someone (Jonathan Lundell?) proposed on this
list, in order to avoid
Kristofer,
thanks for sorting out the details.
I am not sure I buy your argument on LNHarm, as I do not how to
distinguish extremists from non-extremists within the framework of
election theory, where you only have the votes cast to take into
account, and these votes might or might not be
Dear Markus Schulze and all others,
Thanks for the example.
I messed things up a bit with a bad definition, my appologies.
What I would like to see was a violation of a weaker criterion (that
is clear from the example specification).
What I would like then to see a proof of violation, is a less
Dear all,
two clarifications.
With favorite i mean the sincere favorite below.
A correction of an unfinished sentence (addition in CAPITALS):
MFBC and MSFBC say basically, that if some of the voters who have A as
a first preference (i.e. vote A(OR =)...[the other candidates]) in an
election
That I'm aware of, favorite betrayal is almost always a tool to help someone
besides your favorite. Think of plurality: you vote the lesser evil.
Only in a non-monotonic method could it be otherwise. The only non-monotonic
methods worth even mentioning are runoff methods.
Jameson
2011/6/6 Peter
