gone for a day. this is only two days old but it looks like it sat
around a lot longer.
On Jun 16, 2010, at 2:57 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
... there could be an honest CW, and bullet voting creates an
artificial cycle.
...
Anyway, you cannot give simple guarantees like the one you
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
but if cycles are *not* involved (at all, going into a cycle from a
sincere CW or coming out of one), i would be interested in you showing
us how a strategy, such as Bullet Voting, can change the CW from someone
you didn't support to someone you do support.
To
Hi,
Kevin, thanks for the comment.
Well, it is true, that Schulze writes in
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf, page 154, that There has been
some debate about how to define D [Schulze ranking relation] when it is
presumed that on the one side each voter has a sincere linear ordering of
On Thu, Jun 17, 2010 at 1:06 AM, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In
Hi,
a fourth method of measuring the strength of pairwise wins in Condorcet
would be a statistical test called Binomial test.
See: http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/binomial.htm
Excel calculations at: http://udel.edu/~mcdonald/statexactbin.html
Short explanation:
Each vote for candidate
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy which
asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the chances
of my candidate being elected.
If I have a second or third option, the chances of my
On Jun 16, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same
guy which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the
chances of my candidate being
Hi Peter,
My quick responses to this:
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy
which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the
chances
of
Hi Kristofer,
thanks for a detailed answer.
As you answer contingency, it might be beneficial to turn the question
around.
In what situations will bullet voting help my candidate to win (considering
the advanced Condorcet systems)?
Peter
On Wed, Jun 16, 2010 at 8:14 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
2010/6/16 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
On Jun 16, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy
which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
In what situations will bullet voting help my candidate to win
(considering the advanced Condorcet systems)?
The simplest is probably the one you gave. For example:
43 A
27 B vs. BC
30 CB
If B voters don't give
Some more viewpoints that were not covered very well yet.
1) Typical (=all common) Condorcet methods make pairwise comparisons
and derive the results from those comparisons. Changing one's vote
from ABC to AB=C does not change the pairwise comparison results of
ones favourite (A) against
Peter,
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the chances
of my candidate being elected.
Bullet voting in an election using a method that complies with the Condorcet
criterion does I suppose
somewhat increase the chance of your candidate being the Condorcet winner.
But
Chris, thanks for pointing these things out. I didn't know about the
Later-no-Help.
You write: But all Condorcet methods fail Later-no-Help, and in some this
effect is sufficiently strong for the method to have a random fill
incentive.
Do you know for which Condorcet methods this effect is
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 49.
- A loses to C, 49-51. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 51.
Thus: If the
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
Thus: If the three C voters will truncate then they will win instead of B
in winning votes based Condorcet methods.
This is correct, if proportional completion is not used (see page 42
in
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
49.
- A loses to C, 49-51. In
On Jun 17, 2010, at 12:29 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a
écrit :
Thus: If the three C voters will truncate then they will win
instead of B
in winning votes based Condorcet methods.
This is correct, if proportional
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Juho juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
If you are using proportional completion (or
symmetric completion) then
you're not using winning votes, you're using margins.
The described algorithm seemed to make the completion in a
non-symmetric way, leading
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