Hi,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a
écrit :
> > That being said, I think the most promising area of
> development here is
> > based around the concept of a "conditional
> vote" that came up a few
> > threads ago. The idea here being that individual
>
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Instant Range-off Voting is an interesting idea. I thought about it once
a while ago too. I didn't renormalize the ballots though, I just set the
co-highest to 100 and the co-lowest to 0 for each ballot as a sanitation
measure. I eventually abadoned it due to nonmonotonicity,
2008/10/16 Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
>
> I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
>>
>> Let my "honest" rangings be:
>>
>> 100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
>> 20 percent for the frontrunner Cinde
On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
Let my "honest" rangings be:
100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella
0 percent for the other frontrunner Ugly Duckling
I th
>Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
>problem with Range Voting.
>
>The strategy problem:
>You shouldn't cast a ballot with your honest ratings, you should
>maximize them along Approval strategy lines.
>
>It also fixes the counting problem of how if someone does cast
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:38 AM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hey, that's neat. I must have missed it the first time around.
The thread got no replies, which was discouraging. I was considering
extending it to other methods.
I think the java, even for single seaters, gives a more int
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:46 AM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I mean the geometric sense. For ratings a,b,c,etc., sqrt(a*a + b*b + c*c
> ...)
It has the potential to cause cumulative voting like effects. This is
especially true in the initial rounds.
Approval and range votings main p
On Oct 14, 2008, at 12:11 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
problem
with Range Voting.
The method I call "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR):
1. Collect ratin
Hey, that's neat. I must have missed it the first time around. The N
parallel images of black/winning area actually show pretty well how
various candidates win in multi-winner elections. Maybe I'll extend my
software to do similarly.
On Oct 14, 2008, at 12:17 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
Btw, if
Instant Range-off Voting is an interesting idea. I thought about it once a
while ago too. I didn't renormalize the ballots though, I just set the
co-highest to 100 and the co-lowest to 0 for each ballot as a sanitation
measure. I eventually abadoned it due to nonmonotonicity, but I think the
discus
Btw, if we are bringing up old posts :p, any views on this page?
http://ivnryan.com/ping_yee/results.html
since you technically mentioned Yee diagrams.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy problem
> with Range Voting.
> The method I call "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR):
> 1. Collect ratings ballots
> 2. Normalize each ballot so that
Hi, you wrote:
> encourages people to vote honestly
What makes you believe this?
Yours, Jobst
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
With all the talk about Range Voting and its plusses and minuses, I
wanted to inject this back into the mix.
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
problem with Range Voting.
The strategy problem:
You shouldn't cast a ballot with your honest ratings, you should
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