Dan Bishop wrote:
You can't just assume that people would vote strategically in Schulze
elections because they vote strategically in Plurality elections.
The question of what strategy will be used and to what extent is a quite
difficult one. On one hand, individually speaking, voting is not
Warren Smith writes:
I will sketch a proof that, in Schulze beatpaths voting in random
N-candidate V-voter elections (V--infinity, N fixed):
with probability a positive constant C (where C goes to 1 as
N--infinity):
at least a constant fraction K of the voters (where K goes to 3/4
Warren wrote:
I have news for you. The concept of strategic voting is entirely
about caring more about vanishingly small gains in utility than about
honesty.
It's not vanishingly small if you think about it from a team perspective.
Teamwork is part of human nature. The cavemen probably
Warren Smith wrote:
I don't follow most of what you (Michael Poole) said.
However, re your final paragraph
So accepting, arguendo, that 75% of voters might -- a posteriori --
gain expected utility from strategic order reversal, to conclude how
they would feel about that requires an argument
I will sketch a proof that, in Schulze beatpaths voting in random
N-candidate V-voter elections (V--infinity, N fixed):
with probability a positive constant C (where C goes to 1 as N--infinity):
at least a constant fraction K of the voters (where K goes to 3/4
as N--infinity)
will
