The following PR approval voting procedure is an approval limit of Schulze STV
A score for each candidate set is determined in the following way: The vote
of each ballot is distributed amongst the ballot's approved candidates in the
candidate set. The score for each candidate set is the larg
idate, regardless of whether
the rest remained unused.
From: Ross Hyman
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Saturday, 1 October 2011, 5:07
Subject: [EM] PR approval voting
The following PR approval voting procedure is an approval limit of Schulze STV
A score for each candidate set is deter
t;
> From: Ross Hyman
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Sent: Saturday, 1 October 2011, 5:07
> Subject: [EM] PR approval voting
>
> The following PR approval voting procedure is an approval limit of Schulze STV
>
> A score for each candidate set is determined in th
nge Voting pass.
From: Ted Stern
To: Election Methods
Cc: Ted Stern
Sent: Monday, 3 October 2011, 19:45
Subject: Re: [EM] PR approval voting
I'd like to stick my oar in here, to point out that I have an
implementation of Range Transferable Vote, which can be used with
Droop or other quotas
s your PRV method quota-based? If so, does it pass Droop
proportionality? If so, how do you deal with elevating preferences if
no candidate achieves a quota?
Ted
>
> From: Ted Stern
> To: Election Methods
> Cc: Ted Stern
> Sent: Monday, 3 October 2011, 19:45
> Subject: Re: [EM
each ballot is w_i = sum_a w_i,a.
5) The new v_i,a = w_i,a / w_i. Proceed to step 2.
The candidate set with the highest score wins the election.
--- On Sat, 10/1/11, Toby Pereira wrote:
From: Toby Pereira
Subject: Re: [EM] PR approval voting
To: "Ross Hyman" ,
"e
A bit like with single-winner range where you
wouldn't expect one particular faction of voters to vote approval style and
"ruin" the whole thing. (Not that it would necessarily ruin it)
From: Ted Stern
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc: Ted Stern
Sent: Monday, 3 October 20
