On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 2:55 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> Nope. I'm advocating the use of the Hare Quota, not the Droop Quota.
Ahh ok.
So to be guaranteed 2/3 of the seats, you need 2/3 of the vote. But
if some voters vote for non-concentrated parties, then you can get
your 2nd seat for 1/3 mo
They don't always change their priors *much*. It depends on the evidence...
And I do rationalize. I just don't want to rationalize the fact that the
difficulties this list-serve has in agreeing on the best single-winner
election rule is consistent with the possibility that there wouldn't be
that
Bayesians don't accept or reject their priors; they adjust them in response
to any new evidence.
Humans, on the other hand, rationalize. I do it to. But in this case, you
have to admit that you're quacking an awful lot like that kind of duck.
Jameson
2012/2/6 David L Wetzell
> Rationality in t
Rationality in the face of the complexity of reality entails having priors
and valuing empiricism(based on more than a case-study) over theory.
There's not evidence to make me reject my prior that in the short-run in
the US that the variance in the quality of alternatives to FPTP(apart from
"top 2
2012/2/6 David L Wetzell
>
>
Agreed, but no chance this will happen.
>>>
>>> What if electoral analysts put more of their power into showing others
>>> why such a change would be for the greater good, rather than dickering over
>>> which single-winner election rule is the best???
>>>
>>
>
>>> Agreed, but no chance this will happen.
>>>
>>
>> What if electoral analysts put more of their power into showing others
>> why such a change would be for the greater good, rather than dickering over
>> which single-winner election rule is the best???
>>
>
> Perhaps you should apply this auda
2012/2/6 David L Wetzell
>
>
>>
>>> In fact, it might be a good thing to let the pretty darn proportionally
>>> elected state house of reps elect our US senators again!!! Statewide
>>> campaigns are expensive and often driven by the manipulative mainstream
>>> media. And if the state reps got t
that its House of
> Representatives is its legislature (even if there was a 2nd House
> required for bills to pass).
>
You could set it up so that the State House of Reps chooses the Senator and
then the state senate approves of the chosen senator by at least a 40%
rate.
dlw
>
>
>
>
>
>> In fact, it might be a good thing to let the pretty darn proportionally
>> elected state house of reps elect our US senators again!!! Statewide
>> campaigns are expensive and often driven by the manipulative mainstream
>> media. And if the state reps got to elect our US senators every 2 ye
On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 3:57 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> Moreover, if the bicameral state legislatures were selected by both LR Hare
> 3-seats and a single-winner rule (insert your favorite here), then it'd make
> it so that what helped with gerrymandering in one branch would hurt in the
> other b
2012/2/5 David L Wetzell
> I wanted to add that if STV (3-5 seats) with Droop Quota were used
> consistently across the US that there'd be 50 states forming the
> super-districts and so if there were biases due to gerrymandering some of
> them would cancel out...
>
> Also, even though this system
I wanted to add that if STV (3-5 seats) with Droop Quota were used
consistently across the US that there'd be 50 states forming the
super-districts and so if there were biases due to gerrymandering some of
them would cancel out...
Also, even though this system is not terribly 3rd party friendly, i
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 8:07 PM, Bryan Mills wrote:
> Now, despite a 50/50 natural split, the rural party has a 60% supermajority.
> And, of course, if you draw the district lines differently you can do the
> same thing for the urban party.
This was attempted in Ireland, look up Tullymander.
The
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Bryan Mills wrote:
> > From: Bryan Mills
>> > To: David L Wetzell
>> > > If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't
>> > proliferate
>> > > too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep things
>> > > reasonable.
>> >
>> > To get
>
>
>>> They do maintain the constituent-legislator relationship, *for the
>>> subset of voters who voted in favor of the legislator*. For the remaining
>>> Droop quota of un- or under-represented constituents the nonexistence of
>>> the constituent-legislator relationship is also maintained.
>>>
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 3:21 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2012/2/4 Bryan Mills
>
>> > From: Bryan Mills
>>> > To: David L Wetzell
>>> > > If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't
>>> > proliferate
>>> > > too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep things
>>>
2012/2/4 Bryan Mills
> > From: Bryan Mills
>> > To: David L Wetzell
>> > > If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't
>> > proliferate
>> > > too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep things
>> > > reasonable.
>> >
>> > To get reasonable proportionality wi
>
> > From: Bryan Mills
> > To: David L Wetzell
> > > If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't
> > proliferate
> > > too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep things
> > > reasonable.
> >
> > To get reasonable proportionality with only 3-5 seats per distri
On 02/02/2012 07:24 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:
Single-winner is required by 2 USC Sec. 2c:
[...] there shall be established by law a number of
districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such
State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only
from district
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Yes, this works. One downside is that, unlike STV, a hand count becomes
> quite untractable.
I think the random selection method for doing surplus transfers may
still work somewhat.
Approval voting is inherently harder to hand count than pl
>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Bryan Mills
> To: David L Wetzell
> >>> >
> >>> dlw: If the number of possible rankings is the number of seats + 2 then
> >>> it's not too bad. And nobody would be forced to rank umpteen
> candidates,
> >>> so the low-info voters could just v
Yes, this works. One downside is that, unlike STV, a hand count becomes
quite untractable.
Jameson
2012/2/2 Raph Frank
> One possible way of combining AV + STV is to allow equal ranks. This
> method becomes a method that is very similar to approval in the single
> winner case.
>
> When determi
One possible way of combining AV + STV is to allow equal ranks. This
method becomes a method that is very similar to approval in the single
winner case.
When determining if a candidate is elected, all candidates at the rank
share the remaining vote strength, but when determining if a candidate
sh
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 5:26 AM, Ken & Karla wrote:
> [Ken B.] That is incorrect; I know of no such law. Each state can specify
> its own method of electing its federal representatives.
Isn't there a Federal law which states single seat districts? It
isn't constitutionally required, but Congres
>
> Date: Wed, 01 Feb 2012 23:26:47 -0600
> From: Ken & Karla
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] STV+AV
> Message-ID: <4f2a1e97.8080...@isd.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> An
On 2/1/2012 10:54 PM, Bryan Mills wrote:
given that US law requires single-winner FPTP
elections for federal representation and the major parties (who
control the legislature and benefit greatly from FPTP) have no
incentive to change that law.
= = = = =
[Ken B.
>>> > Why STV? The original poster wanted elected representatives to have
>>> votes
>>> > proportional to their electoral support yes? There's no need for
>>> fractional
>>> > transfers from elected candidates then.
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > IRV is a form of STV, but it's not my favorite. Some of the ot
>
> > Why STV? The original poster wanted elected representatives to have votes
> > proportional to their electoral support yes? There's no need for
> fractional
> > transfers from elected candidates then.
> > >
> >
> > IRV is a form of STV, but it's not my favorite. Some of the other STV
> > meth
On 1/31/12 3:23 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
STV requires much more work on the part of the voter - ranking all
the way down to a candidate likely to be elected, instead of just
one. That probably means a much larger ballot and/or an arbitrary
cutoff between ballot-candidates and
> Why STV? The original poster wanted elected representatives to have votes
> proportional to their electoral support yes? There's no need for fractional
> transfers from elected candidates then.
> >
>
> IRV is a form of STV, but it's not my favorite. Some of the other STV
> methods (e.g. Schulze-
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