It seems to me that the ballots that go into the consensus urn should be
approval style. Otherwise two good
compromise options could cancel each other out.
Also, the mark favorite (with 1) and compromise (with 2) on the same ballot
method should allow for more
than one compromise for the same
Hi Raph,
> The odds of it actually working are pretty low. For it to work, all
> voters must be aware that C is a valid compromise.
Sure, that's the flipside of it being so ultimately simple. The easiest way to
safeguard against a small number of non-cooperative voters would be to require
only
On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 9:02 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear folks,
>
> I want to describe the most simple solution to the problem of how to
> make sure option C is elected in the following situation:
>
> a% having true utilities A(100) > C(alpha) > B(0),
> b% having true utilities B(100) >
70 > max(50,50)*100
>
> but the A supporters may prefer random ballot from the favourites urn to the
> possible consensus result (C) and therefore vote (e.g.) for A in their
> consensus ballot.
>
> Juho
>
>
>
> --- On Sun, 1/2/09, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
&
Dear folks,
I want to describe the most simple solution to the problem of how to
make sure option C is elected in the following situation:
a% having true utilities A(100) > C(alpha) > B(0),
b% having true utilities B(100) > C(beta) > A(0).
with a+b=100 and a*alpha + b*beta > max(a,
