Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-13 Thread Andy Jennings
ying they could still threaten to > defect, and even carry out their threat. > There is no absolute way out of that. > > - Original Message - > From: Andy Jennings > Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 12:40 pm > Subject: Re: [EM] This might be the method we've be

Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-12 Thread fsimmons
still threaten to defect, and even carry out their threat. There is no absolute way out of that. - Original Message - From: Andy Jennings Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 12:40 pm Subject: Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for: To: Jameson Quinn Cc: fsimm...@pc

Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-12 Thread Andy Jennings
You're right. I've drawn out the game theory matrix and the honest outcome: 49 C 27 A>B 24 B>A is indeed the stable one, with A winning. So the only way for B to win is for his supporters to say they are indifferent between A and C and threaten to bullet vote "B". Then the A supporters fall for

Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-09 Thread Jameson Quinn
No, the B group has nothing to gain by defecting; all they can do is bring about a C win. Honestly, A group doesn't have a lot to gain from defecting, either; either they win anyway, or they misread the election and they're actually the B's. Jameson 2011/12/9 Andy Jennings > Here’s a method tha

Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-09 Thread Andy Jennings
> > Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we have > been worrying about lately: > > (1) For each ballot beta, construct two matrices M1 and M2: > In row X and column Y of matrix M1, enter a one if ballot beta rates X > above Y or if beta gives a top > rating to X. O

Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-03 Thread fsimmons
Chris, you're right that it is very close to MinMax(margins). Let's compare and contrast: In both MinMax versions a matrix M is used to determine the winner in the same way: if the least number in row i is greater than the least number in any other row of the matrix M, then candidate i is e

[EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-03 Thread C.Benham
Forest, I don't understand the algorithm's definition. It seems to be saying that it's MinMax(Margins), only computing X's gross pairwise score against Y by giving X 2 points for every ballot on which X is both top-rated and voted strictly above Y, and otherwise giving X 1 point for every bal

Re: [EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-02 Thread fsimmons
This new method (Top Tier Pairwise Rule modified MinMax) gives a satisfactory resolution to "Kevin's Bad MMPO Example:" 49 A 01 A=C 01 B=C 49 B It yields a tie between A and B. Shall we call the method MinMax(TTPR)? - Original Message - From: Date: Friday, December 2, 2011 4:12 pm Su

[EM] This might be the method we've been looking for:

2011-12-02 Thread fsimmons
Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we have been worrying about lately: (1) For each ballot beta, construct two matrices M1 and M2: In row X and column Y of matrix M1, enter a one if ballot beta rates X above Y or if beta gives a top rating to X. Otherw