Hi all,
I've been thinking a bit lately about the lack of Condorcet methods in
public elections. I have written a rough outline of why Borda-elimination
(Baldwin) is an attractive option for implementation in the public sphere.
If you are interested, check out:
http://thefell.googlepages.com/
I'm not aware of much in the way of serious opposition to the two-party
majority vote. in fact any reasonable methodology should reduce to the
majority vote when there are two candidates. The only method (to my
knowledge) that doesn't do this is range voting. www.rangevoting.org. Range
voting redu
"Condorcet" caught my eye - I think it deserves more attention but do not
know how to get there.
I see Borda as more complex, without offering benefits to justify the
cost. I do not see counting Borda as a flavor of Condorcet.
Answering your questions:
1- Condorcet is understandable if p
favorable candidate that he
buried the condorcet winner behind.
cheers,
Ian
-Original Message-
From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2007 7:47 PM
To: Ian Fellows
Cc: Election Methods Mailing List
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination,
Dear Ian Fellows,
the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate
monotonicity and independence of clones. They also
violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not
in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the
result of the elections.
When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted so
MAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of
Markus Schulze
Sent: Friday, December 21, 2007 1:47 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method
for public elections?
Dear Ian Fellows,
the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate
monotonici
his more favorable candidate would
> be chosen from the smith set, verses the less favorable candidate that he
> buried the condorcet winner behind.
>
>
> cheers,
> Ian
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent:
minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up for
> by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty
> understanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method has
> been
> adopted by any government?
>
>
> Ian
> http://thefell.googlepages.com
>
>
>
&g
s would be a big problem outside FPP, where
> > vote-splitting is rampant.
> >
> > So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made up
> > for
> > by the additional simplicity in populations that would have difficulty
> > understandin
erstanding beat-path? Why do you think that no Condorcet method
> has been
> adopted by any government?
I hope I managed to explain my opinions on this question clearly
enough already above.
Juho
>
>
> Ian
> http://thefell.googlepages.com
>
>
>
> -Original Mess
nferiority. but at least it passes them when there is a Condorcet
>> winner. I
>> seriously doubt that clones would be a big problem outside FPP, where
>> vote-splitting is rampant.
>>
>> So guess I'd ask if the minor theoretical deficiencies are not made
>> up
Dave Ketchum > Sent: 22 December 2007 01:35
> The standard method of describing IRV skips its problem of failures due to
> not looking at all that the ballot says - so implied understanding aids
> its acceptance without bothering with true understanding.
To say that the standard method describin
Conceded that some could like IRV, even after understanding what it does.
HOWEVER, what it does is hidden behind its advertising, and its popularity
should plummet like a rock if a true description was seen by more.
The description does not have to say "failure", as I see appropriate
- jus
On Dec 22, 2007, at 6:45 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
> If you wish to utilise in some way all the information that could be
> recorded on a preferential ballot, that is a completely
> different voting system from IRV, with different objectives. The
> preferences are no longer 'contingency choice
Dave Ketchum > Sent: 22 December 2007 18:01
>
> Conceded that some could like IRV, even after understanding what it does.
It wasn't my intent to make any point for or against IRV, but it interesting
another thread is discussing the reasons for the use of
IRV and the non-use of Condorcet in publ
> On Dec 22, 2007, at 6:45 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
> > If you wish to utilise in some way all the information that could be
> > recorded on a preferential ballot, that is a completely
> > different voting system from IRV, with different objectives. The
> > preferences are no longer 'contingency
On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 19:09:49 - James Gilmour wrote:
> Dave Ketchum > Sent: 22 December 2007 18:01
>
>>Conceded that some could like IRV, even after understanding what it does.
>
>
> It wasn't my intent to make any point for or against IRV, but it interesting
> another thread is discussing
On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 19:46:07 - James Gilmour wrote:
>>On Dec 22, 2007, at 6:45 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
>>
>>>If you wish to utilise in some way all the information that could be
>>>recorded on a preferential ballot, that is a completely
>>>different voting system from IRV, with different objec
Dave Ketchum > Sent: 22 December 2007 21:52
>
> Out of all this I see very little possible use for differences:
That is the problem. So you will continue to describe the different ballots
and voting systems incorrectly.
James Gilmour
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On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 22:03:03 - James Gilmour wrote:
> Dave Ketchum > Sent: 22 December 2007 21:52
>
>>Out of all this I see very little possible use for differences:
>
>
> That is the problem. So you will continue to describe the different ballots
> and voting systems incorrectly.
Topic o
Hallo,
the following example demonstrates that the Baldwin
method violates reversal symmetry.
Situation #1:
5 ACB
4 BAC
2 CBA
The initial Borda scores are 14 for candidate A,
10 for candidate B, and 9 for candidate C.
Candidate C is eliminated, because candidate C
h
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