The scenario46 A>>B>C5 B>>A>C5 B>>C>A44 C>>B>Asuggests that ninety percent of
the voters would rationally prefer a Random Ballot drawing over the sure
election of Condorcet Candidate B.As for Approval; since the B voters are so
evenly divided in their slight preferences relative to A and C, th
On Dec 10, 2007, at 8:00 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Since A & C are tied, you cannot do any better than B.
>
> Get far enough away, and A or C will properly win.
>
> I do not like '>>' for Condorcet.
'>>' seems like a useful shorthand to describe the "sincere
preferences" of the voters here.
It
Since A & C are tied, you cannot do any better than B.
Get far enough away, and A or C will properly win.
I do not like '>>' for Condorcet.
On Mon, 10 Dec 2007 14:17:53 -0300 Diego Santos wrote:
> Suppose this scenario:
>
> 46: A >> B > C
> 5: B >> A > C
> 5: B >> C > A
> 44: C >> B > A
>
> B
Suppose this scenario:
46: A >> B > C
5: B >> A > C
5: B >> C > A
44: C >> B > A
B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters.
A possible patch is to avoid rank-only ballots and ignore candidates with
less than 1/2 approval (or total score, if range ballots are used) of the
mo
