On Sun, 30 Mar 2008 23:48:56 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:27 PM 3/30/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Runoffs main value is recovering from a methods weaknesses until
something can be done about the method. They are too expensive to
be accepted as if a normal part of a usable method.
On Sat, 29 Mar 2008 23:28:22 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:32 PM 3/29/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some see forest; some see trees; who sees all?
Those who see a forest made up of trees.
Looking at the 31 voter Plurality example:
16 voted for candidates with 3 or more Ys -
At 08:30 AM 3/30/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 29 Mar 2008 23:28:22 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:32 PM 3/29/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some see forest; some see trees; who sees all?
Those who see a forest made up of trees.
Looking at the 31 voter Plurality example:
16 voted
On Sun, 30 Mar 2008 12:54:40 -0400 Sun, 30 Mar 2008 12:54:40 -0400 Abd
ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 08:30 AM 3/30/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 29 Mar 2008 23:28:22 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:32 PM 3/29/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some see forest; some see trees; who sees all?
At 10:27 PM 3/30/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Runoffs main value is recovering from a methods weaknesses until
something can be done about the method. They are too expensive to
be accepted as if a normal part of a usable method.
What is missed here is that the basic requirement for an election
Building on those thoughts, let's try something with Plurality:
Start with that collection of voters and issues.
Invert all the issues so that a Y will attract the same voters as an
N did, and an N will attract those who had gone for Y.
Note that will now attract the
Looking closer, I tripped on this one:
Note that will now attract the same 5 voters who had gone for
, and the new will get 0 votes.
Saying it more carefully:
Note that previous , now labelled , will attract the same
5 voters who had gone for , and the
At 12:17 PM 3/27/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ok, I give up on poking at this one.
While the stated votes may be possible, I do not accept them as being of
enough expectability to be useful in comparison among the election systems.
Dave, you've been reading the Election Methods list for quite some
On Thu, 27 Mar 2008 22:12:45 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 12:17 PM 3/27/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ok, I give up on poking at this one.
While the stated votes may be possible, I do not accept them as being of
enough expectability to be useful in comparison among the election
On Fri, 28 Mar 2008 08:30:47 -0400 Warren Smith wrote:
YN is made to appear as a comparison of methods, whereas it is tailored to
make Range look good.
--
1. it does make range look good, but
2. but no - I disagree it was tailored for that purpose.
It is a natural thing to
Ok, I give up on poking at this one.
While the stated votes may be possible, I do not accept them as being of
enough expectability to be useful in comparison among the election systems.
DWK
On Wed, 26 Mar 2008 11:13:42 -0400 Warren Smith wrote:
Then have THE SAME voters vote Range and
Then have THE SAME voters vote Range and Condorcet. I would expect
comparable vote counts - if that does not happen, tell us why.
--I *do* use the same voters for Range Condorcet. In the example answer e,
the range voters elect the best winner ,
and the Condorcet voters elect the worst
At 01:02 AM 3/24/2008, you wrote:
Yeah, I'm confused too. I haven't even figured out how second choices
are determined for IRV and Condorcet.
Even? That's much harder and was not specified. The first problem
is easy. Just read the thing, and don't make assumptions. It was
stated accurately.
On Tue, Mar 25, 2008 at 6:21 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:51:42 -0400 you wrote:
I went thru several thoughts:
Did you make up the data?
--yes.
So I question the quality:
Why is Plurality not going to be neutral, echoing data
At 11:21 PM 3/23/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 22 Mar 2008 19:35:13 -0400 Warren Smith wrote:
The YN model - a simple voting model in which range voting behaves
optimally while many competing voting systems (including Condorcet)
can behave pessimally:
At 01:27 PM 3/24/2008, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
So we eliminate, for the individual voter, the exact match candidate.
We now have a choice of candidates who agree with the voter on three
out of four issues. The problem, you will note, isn't solved on that
web page. We could make a nice neat
thanks Abd.
I was going to use Eric Gorr's online Condorcet calculator to do
this election, but it turned out his calculator has bugs - probably
related to my
names being things like YYNY being too similar.
Also his contact Gorr with email button also has a bug (it sends
your message to nowhere)
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 22 Mar 2008 19:35:13 -0400 Warren Smith wrote:
The YN model - a simple voting model in which range voting behaves
optimally while many competing voting systems (including Condorcet)
can behave pessimally:
http://rangevoting.org/PuzzAggreg.html
When I
The YN model - a simple voting model in which range voting behaves
optimally while many competing voting systems (including Condorcet)
can behave pessimally:
http://rangevoting.org/PuzzAggreg.html
--
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org -- add your endorsement (by clicking endorse
as 1st
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